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Two DECADES AGO, a ferocious  debate  erupted  about  the feasibility  and 
desirability  of future economic growth. The popular  imagination  was 
captured  by a study of the world economy known as The Limits to 
Growth.' This work, sponsored by the mysterious-sounding  Club of 
Rome, convinced many that unfettered  economic growth  had come to 
an end and  that  the world  was entering  the "era  of limits." 
The emergence  of the anti-growth  school was the latest  peak in a long 
intellectual  cycle of pessimism about economic growth  that originated 
with Reverend  T.R. Malthus  in the early 1800s. But such concerns re- 
ceded from  the public  consciousness in the 1970s  and early 1980s  as the 
immediacy  of skyrocketing  oil prices, a growing  international  debt cri- 
sis, mounting  fiscal  imbalances,  and slowing  productivity  and  real  wage 
growth  displaced  vaguer  long-term  anxieties about declining  resources 
and  growing  entropy. 
At the end of the long economic expansion  of the 1980s,  with stagfla- 
tion subdued,  concerns  about  long-run  viability  reemerged,  but  this time 
with different emphases. The major concerns of today's critics of 
growth  are not inadequate  resources, but excessive consumption.  Two 
decades ago, a Newsweek cover captured  the zeitgeist of the times: an 
empty cornucopia  and a headline  that stated that the world was "Run- 
ning Out of Everything."  Then, people fretted  about factories grinding 
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to a halt  as oil wells ran  dry. Today's  apocalyptic  scenarios  feature  econ- 
omies and ecosystems disrupted  by smoke-belching  factories  and swel- 
tering  climates  overheated  by greenhouse  gases. 
Greenhouse  warming  is but one of the new environmental  ailments 
that  may be by-products  of economic growth.  Other  global  concerns in- 
clude increasing  evidence of widespread  damage  from  acid rain;  the ap- 
pearance  of the "ozone hole" in the Antarctic,  along  with ozone deple- 
tion in temperate  regions;  deforestation,  especially in the tropical  rain 
forests, which may upset the global ecological balance; soil erosion, 
which  threatens  the long-term  viability  of agriculture;  and  the extinction 
of species, which, among other things, threatens  to impede future ad- 
vances in medical  and other  technologies. On top of these global  issues 
are the more  mundane-but probably  more  lethal-issues  of air, water, 
and soil pollution. 
Economists  have often belied their  tradition  as the dismal  science by 
downplaying  both earlier  concerns about the limitations  from exhaust- 
ible resources and the current  alarm  about  potential  environmental  ca- 
tastrophe.  However, to dismiss  today's ecological concerns  out of hand 
would be reckless. Because boys have mistakenly  cried "wolf' in the 
past does not mean  that the woods are safe. In the sections that  follow, 
I will discuss some of the major  concerns about economic growth  from 
both theoretical  and empirical  points of view. I will use the limits-to- 
growth debate as a reference point to understand  the earlier debate 
about  the limits  to and  perils  of growth,  and  to provide  some perspective 
about  the newer  debate  about  environmental  threats. 
Background  to the Debate 
The 1972  version of the Limits  to Growth  (hereafter  known  as Limits 
1) had its origin in increasing  concern about the sustainability  of eco- 
nomic growth  in a finite  world. The debate  found an eager  audience  be- 
cause of the concerns in the early 1970s  about  rapid  population  growth 
and increasing  pollution  in developing  countries and-after  1973-up- 
wardly spiraling  oil prices and sharply  declining  growth in output and 
living standards  in the major  industrial  countries. 
Limits  I did not sprout  in an intellectual  desert. Although  the limits- 
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the popular  press, a quieter  and  more  profound  scientific  revolution  was 
also underway.  Sober scientific analyses such as the Study of Critical 
Environmental  Problems identified  a number  of potentially important 
global issues, particularly  climate change, and suggested a modest 
change  in priorities  necessary to meet the problems.2 
However, the approach  taken in Limits  I concentrated  primarily  on 
the classic economic questions  raised  by Malthus  and David Ricardo- 
questions  of induced  population  growth  and  diminishing  returns  to labor 
with fixed land. The ultimate  message was that so many  constraints  op- 
erate on the global economy that there is no way to wriggle  out of the 
straitjacket  of resource limitations.  In the next section, I will sketch a 
model  of economic  growth  that  will show how the various  constraints  in 
the limits-to-growth  models operate  to send humanity  back  to the living 
standards  of the Dark  Ages. 
Evolution of  Views 
In the two decades since Limits  I, the anti-growth  message has mu- 
tated. Criticisms  of the Limits  I view made  by economists  and  engineers 
have convinced  many  that  two major  factors-technological change  and 
the market  mechanism-can prevent  the scarcity  of appropriable  natu- 
ral  resources  from  constituting  a significant  drag  on long-term  economic 
growth. 
At the same time, economists have not been able to vouchsafe that 
the invisible  hand  can automatically  solve environmental  problems.  Al- 
though  in principle  governments  could  internalize  pollution  externalities 
through  such devices as effluent  taxes or auctionable  quotas, legislators 
have proved immune  to these ideas. Studies of the efficiency of actual 
regulatory approaches to controlling externalities have consistently 
found that regulations  have been poorly designed and that the costs of 
control  have far exceeded the estimated  benefits  of efficient  policies.' 
By the early 1990s,  a new vision of the long-run  limits  to growth  was 
developing  among  environmental  economists and  economically  minded 
environmentalists  and scientists. The new view holds that  long-run  con- 
straints  upon economic growth  might  well exist, but that these are un- 
2. Study  of Critical  Environmental  Problems  (1970). 
3.  See Tietenberg  (1988). 4  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
likely  to  arise  because  of  intrinsic  limitations  of  natural resources. 
Rather, the limitations would be more likely to arise from one of two 
other factors,  both involving market failures. One possibility is that the 
scale of human activity could overwhelm the capacity of the globe to tol- 
erate industrial wastes; this, in turn, could drive the cost of reducing or 
recycling wastes to astronomical levels.  This is the "scale limit." A sec- 
ond possibility  is the "political limit." While reducing harmful side ef- 
fects is in principle possible  at modest cost,  human societies  might lack 
the political will or skill to take measures to internalize the externalities. 
Among those who hold the new view of the limits to growth are the 
nervous and the relaxed. The nervous include many from the environ- 
mental community, which is becoming increasingly hostile to economic 
growth in poor and rich countries,  alike. Our planet is under siege,  and 
humans are the major enemy,  the argument runs. The World Commis- 
sion on Environment  and Development  (the Brundtland Commission) 
wrote: 
Nature  is bountiful,  but  it is also  fragile  and  finely  balanced.  There  are  thresholds 
that cannot be crossed without endangering  the basic integrity  of the system. 
Today  we are close to many  of these thresholds;  we must  be ever mindful  of the 
risk  of endangering  the survival  of life on Earth.4 
Priorities of  environmentalists  are sometimes  at variance  with  tradi- 
tional economic  approaches, as in the statement by a Canadian environ- 
mental group, the Saskatchewan  Environment Society: 
We are deep-air  animals  living inside an ecological system....  The mainte- 
nance  of the ecosphere  is . . . the first  priority.  Economic  development  must  be 
secondary,  guided  by strict  ecological  standards.' 
The dangers of economic development is a theme of the limits-to-growth 
research  team,  recycled  for the  1992 publication,  Beyond  the Limits 
(hereafter known as Limits II): 
Human  use of many  essential  resources  and  generation  of many  kinds  of pollut- 
ants have already  surpassed  rates that are physically  sustainable.  Without  sig- 
nificant  reductions  in material  and  energy  flows, there  will be in the coming  dec- 
ades an  uncontrolled  decline  in per  capita  food output,  energy  use, and  industrial 
production.6 
4.  World  Commission  on Environment  and  Development  (1987,  pp. 32-33). 
5. From  a statement  by Stanley  Rowe at the public  hearing  of the World  Commission 
on Environment  and  Development,  Ottawa,  May  26-27, 1986,  cited in World  Commission 
on Environment  and  Development  (1987,  p. 293). 
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Economists, on the other hand, tend to be at the relaxed end of the 
spectrum,  perhaps  because they see so many  other horrors.  One of the 
severest critics of the older Malthusian  view was Wilfred  Beckerman, 
who had especially harsh  words for Limits  I. In a recent essay, he puts 
forth  the new view of limits  eloquently: 
[T]he  important  environmental  problems  for the 75 percent  of the world's  popu- 
lation  that  live in developing  countries  are  local problems  of access to safe drink- 
ing water or decent sanitation,  and urban  degradation.  Furthermore,  there is 
clear  evidence that.  . . in the end the best-and  probably  the only-way  to at- 
tain  a decent environment  in most countries  is to become rich.7 
Limits II 
The purpose of the 1992  version, Beyond the Limits, was primarily 
to "update"  the earlier  version. I was curious to see how the profound 
developments  in economics, science, and  technology  had  influenced  the 
approach.  I was disappointed.  The new version turns  out to be "Lethal 
Model  2"  with the same cast, plot, lines, and  computerized  scenery. 
To refresh  the memories  of those who have forgotten  or inform  those 
who never  knew, I will outline  the basic structure  of the LTG  model  and 
sketch its basic conclusions. The basic structure  is an aggregate  model 
of the world  economy. The model takes the form  of a system of nonlin- 
ear  difference  equations,  most of them  being  first-order.  The system can 
be written  succinctly  as 
(1)  Y,=  F(Y,  ,Z,  P), 
where  t is time; Y,  is the set of endogenous  variables,  approximately  150 
in number,  of which the most important  are  population,  pollution,  food, 
industrial  output,  and  nonrenewable  natural  resources;  Z,  represents  the 
exogenous variables;  and ,3  represents  the system's parameters. 
The model's structure  was basically determined  in the 1972  vintage 
and, with some exceptions, was retained  in its entirety  for the 1992  vin- 
tage. The authors  represented  advances in economic and scientific  un- 
derstanding  since 1972  by seven changes. First, Limits II reduced the 
"lifetime"  of land from 6000 years to 1000  years because of increased 
erosion. Second, the new version slightly  changed  the (time-invariant) 
agricultural  production  function  because of increases  in land  productiv- 
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ity. Third,  the 1992  text shifted  the (time-invariant)  function  relating  re- 
source use to output downward  to reflect the observed decline in re- 
source use per unit of output. Fourth, the authors allowed industrial 
capital  to be invested  in pollution-abatement  technology.  Finally,  Limits 
II lowered birth rates, decreased desired family size to reflect demo- 
graphic  trends,  and  increased  the impact  of health  services on life expec- 
tancy.8 
FINDINGS.  The modified  model  was then used to create scenarios  to 
describe the possible evolution of the world economy. The findings  of 
Limits I were dismal: 
If present  growth  trends  in world  population,  industrialization,  pollution,  food 
production,  and  resource  depletion  continue  unchanged,  the limits  to growth  on 
this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred  years. The 
most probable  result  will be a rather  sudden  and  uncontrollable  decline in both 
population  and  industrial  capacity.9 
With  little change  in the structure  of the LTG  model, it is not surpris- 
ing that the results of Limits II differ  little from those of Limits I. The 
baseline scenario  is one in which "the  world society proceeds along its 
historical  path as long as possible without  major  policy change.  "'0 The 
basic scenario shows that per capita  food production  peaks in 1994  and 
then falls by 40 percent over the next three decades; that per capita in- 
dustrial  production  peaks around  2010, then declines at about  4 percent 
annually  through  the 21  st century  to a level of about  5 percent  of its peak 
by 2100;  and that population  goes through  a Malthusian  crisis, growing 
rapidly  until around  2035, and then declining  by over half by the end of 
the next century. 
One question  about  the LTG  models is whether  they are robust  to al- 
ternative specifications.  Limits I claimed that the basic mode of over- 
shoot and  collapse is an intrinsic  feature  of the model. Thus 
[The]  present  world  model . ..  has led us to one conclusion  that appears  to be 
justified  under all the assumptions  we have tested so far. The basic behavior 
mode of the world  system is exponential  growth  of population  and capital,  fol- 
lowed  by collapse.  11 
8. The published  writings  do not contain  a description  of the model's equations.  I 
gleaned  these from  a computer  program  that  the authors  supplied. 
9.  Limits I (p. 23). 
10.  Limits II (p. 131). 
11. Limits  I (p. 142).  Emphasis  in original. William  D. Nordhaus  7 
The same theme runs through Limits II, although it is more cautious 
in tone: 
[T]he  model system, and by implication  the "real  world"  system, has a strong 
tendency  to overshoot  and  collapse. In fact, in the thousands  of model  runs  we 
have tried  over the years, overshoot and collapse has been by far the most fre- 
quent outcome. 12 
I will take up the issue of the system's  robustness again later. 
Utopia in Limitland 
Using the model of Limits II, the authors attempt to lay out a series 
of steps that would prevent overshoot  and collapse.  Most of the steps 
would be noncontroversial,  such as using resources more efficiently, in- 
creasing land yields,  and abating lethal pollution.  Some would be con- 
troversial but arguably sensible,  such as limiting population.  The final 
proposal is so striking that I will quote it in full: 
[The  scenario]  shows a simulated  world . ..  with a definition  of "enough."  This 
world  has decided  to aim  for an average  industrial  output  per capita  of $350  per 
person  per year-about the equivalent  of that  in South  Korea,  or twice the level 
of Brazil  in 1990....  If this hypothetical  society could also reduce  military  ex- 
penditures  and corruption,  a stabilized  economy with an industrial  output  per 
capita  of $350  would be equivalent  in material  comforts  to the average  level in 
Europe  in 1990.13 
This astonishing passage is one of the few recommendations in Limits 
II that can be held up to the light of statistical analysis.  While the defini- 
tion of "industrial output" is unclear, the factual predicates of the recom- 
mendation are so faulty that one wonders whether Limits II is referring 
to another planet. 14 A rough estimate of global per capita GNP in 1990 
12. Limits  II (pp. 136-37). 
13. Limits II (pp. 195f). 
14. Considerable  ambiguity  surrounds  the meaning  of the term  "industrial  output"  in 
Limits  II. Industrial  output  would appear  to be an input  into GNP, but is distinguished 
from  GNP because  GNP is "kept  in money terms, not physical  terms"  (Limits  II, p. 34). 
The  implicit  production  function  seems to be that  industrial  output  is used  to make  various 
kinds  of capital  and the capital  then makes  output  in different  sectors according  to fixed 
capital-output  ratios.  It appears  then  that  "industrial  output"  corresponds  to GNP. 
According  to personal  communication  with one of the authors  of Limits  II, Dennis 
Meadows,  this passage  has been misinterpreted  and  the $350  figure  should  apply  to "con- 
sumer  goods"  (which  I assume  to mean  consumption  of goods and services)  in 1968  U.S. 8  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
would  be $4200,  while that  of OECD  countries  would  be $20,170.  South 
Korea's per capita GDP in purchasing-power-parity  terms in 1990  was 
$7190,  not $350. The per capita  GDP of the poorest country  in Western 
Europe, Portugal,  was almost $8000  in 1990.15  The Limits  II proposals 
would limit our material  aspirations  to attaining  the living standards  of 
Somalia  or Chad.  At these income  levels, we surely  could  not afford  sec- 
ondary  or college education,  a good economics textbook, or the Brook- 
ings Institution,  and to purchase  Limits  II would take a month's  wages. 
The world  could not afford  to undertake  the investments  to slow global 
warming  or the research  and development  to develop resource-saving 
technological  change. The LTG prescription  would save the planet at 
the expense of its inhabitants. 
Limits in Simple Growth Models 
Limits  I and  II are not user-friendly  for those who want  to peer inside 
the model's black box. The structure  is represented  by equations  with 
arbitrary  step functions  in computer  language.  Moreover, once the ac- 
tual specifications  are unearthed,  they do not conform  to either  national 
accounting  systems or to standard  economic definitions,  nor does any 
explanation  occur  for the wealth  of analytic  neologisms.  In an earlier  pa- 
per, I attempted  to describe and simulate the structure  of LTG-type 
models.  16 In this section, I will follow a different  approach  and specify a 
general model incorporating  potential  growth limits. Then I will show 
how the economy can run  aground. 
dollars.  Using  the consumption  deflator,  this statement  would  then translate  into around 
$1,230  per capita  of consumption  in 1990.  Because personal  consumption  expenditure  is 
around  65 percent  of GNP, this  represents  per  capita  GNP  of around  $1,900  in 1990,  which 
means  that  the revised  statement  is off by a factor  of 11,  as compared  to a factor  of 58 for 
the published  version. The puzzle about  the revised  interpretation  is that "production  of 
consumer  goods"  nowhere  appears  in the model  of Limits  II. Moreover,  the stabilized  run 
refers  to stabilizing  industrial  output,  not  consumption.  Finally,  one is tempted  to say that, 
unlike  fine  wines, old prices  sour  quickly. 
15. Data  are from  World  Bank  (1992,  table 1, p. 218, and table  30, p. 276). Individual 
country  data are from  the United Nations' International  Comparison  Project  estimates, 
while  those for  groups  of countries  use official  exchange  rates. 
16. Nordhaus  (1973a). William  D. Nordhaus  9 
The General Resource-constrained  Model 
I will start  with a general  model of a closed economy (say, the world) 
that is an extension of the standard  neoclassical growth model. It has 
two outputs and multiple  inputs. For simplicity, I omit the time sub- 
scripts, t, where inessential. The aggregate  production  function  for the 
economy  is given  by 
(2)  Y =  G(X, P)  =  F(L, R, T, K; H), 
where Y  is real output  corrected  for pollution  and other  externalities;  X 
is gross output  (GNP);  P is pollution  (which  is a "bad");  L is labor  inputs, 
which are proportional  to population;  R is the flow of natural  resource 
inputs;  T  is land  inputs;  K is capital  services, proportional  to the capital 
stock; and H represents  the level of technology. G is an index of true 
national  income that  corrects  for any disamenities,  while F is a smooth, 
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale  production  function  in which all 
inputs  have positive marginal  products  and  diminishing  returns.  In addi- 
tion, I assume that  factors  are paid  their  marginal  products. 
The model can be conveniently  recast by rewriting  it in the form  of a 
generalized  Cobb-Douglas  production function.  Any  smooth  produc- 
tion function  of the kind depicted in equation  2 can be written  without 
loss of generality  as a power  function  in which the exponents  are the lo- 
cal elasticities of output  with respect to the inputs. For notational  pur- 
poses, I use capital  letters to represent  the (variable)  output  elasticities 
of the generalized  Cobb-Douglas  production  function;  I reserve lower- 
case symbols  for the special  case of the conventional  Cobb-Douglas  pro- 
duction  function  in which the elasticities are constant. Hence equation 
2 can be rewritten  as follows for the generalized  Cobb-Douglas  produc- 
tion function: 
(3)  Y =  HLVRA  TEKA. 
In this representation,  the exponents are  functions  of the factor  propor- 
tions,  so fl  =  fQ(L,  R,  T, K; t) =  (d  Y/dL)LIY,  with the analogous rela- 
tions holding  for the other  exponents  of equation  3. 
I will next discuss how the elasticities  change  over time as a function 
of the shape  of the production  function.  In this approach,  the elasticities 
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change.  If the elasticities  of substitution  between  pairs  of factors  are not 
unity, the output elasticities will change over time.'7 If elasticities of 
substitution  are  constant,  equal,  and  less than  unity, and  if technological 
change is Hicks-neutral,  then the output elasticities will rise over time 
for the slowest growing  input  and will fall over time  for the fastest grow- 
ing input. Eventually, in this case, the marginal  product  of the slowest 
growing  factor will tend toward  its average  product, which means that 
its output  elasticity  and share  will tend toward  unity. This tendency can 
be reversed  or accelerated  to the extent that  technological  change  is not 
Hicks-neutral. 
Although  this setup looks quite complicated,  it is much simpler  than 
the actual  LTG  models, which  contain  time  delays, multiple  sectors and 
resources, and other  features  that  obscure, rather  than  inform,  the sys- 
tem. Because the system displays constant  returns  to scale, fQ,  + A, + 
r,  +  A, equals one at every point of time. Given the assumptions,  the 
elasticities are equal to their factor shares, which would be fQ,  =  0.6; 
A, =  O.1;F, =  0.1;andA,  =  0.2 atpresent. 
A SIMPLER  MODEL.  The general  resource  limits model in equation  3 
can be simulated  on a computer,  but it is fruitful  to make some simplifi- 
cations so that analytical  solutions  are possible. The model can be sim- 
plified  without losing any critical properties  as follows. First, assume 
that  there  is a fixed capital-to-output  ratio, v = KIY.  This assumption  is 
of little  importance  and  is made  in the LTG  models.  18  Next, ignore  pollu- 
tion at the outset. Third,  assume that  land  is constant. This is a conven- 
tional assumption  and is probably  a reasonable  first approximation  to 
the actual  fact. 
Finally,  assume that  there  is a fixed  initial  stock of natural  resources, 
S*. Modeling  the allocation  of a fixed supply of exhaustible  resources 
over time is a complex problem,  and I simplify  it by assuming  that ,. of 
the remaining  resources  are consumed  in each period  t. This gives 
(4)  R,=  .S*e-I'. 
17. For constant-returns-to-scale  production  functions  of the form Y = F(K, L), the 
elasticity  of substitution  (between  K and  L) is defined  in terms  of the partial  derivatives  of 
F as a = FKFLIFKL, where  Fj is the partial  derivative  of F with respect  to  j and  K and L 
are capital  and labor, respectively. A nontechnical  review of different  definitions  of the 
elasticity  of substitution  in production  functions  can be found  in Solow (1967). 
18. In most cases, if saving is a constant  fraction  of output, this will lead to a fixed 
capital-to-output  ratio. William  D. Nordhaus  11 
Using equation  4 and the other assumptions  above, a transformed  pro- 
duction  function  can be derived  as follows: 
(5)  Y, =  KHII(I-A)L,/1I(IA-)R  tA(I-)  =  K'HtII - ^)  Lt(l  -  ) e - 
where K and K'  are inessential parameters.  Equation  5 is now easy to 
analyze. The new initial values of the parameters  are Q/(1 -  A) = 
0.6/(1  -  0.2)  =  0.75 and A/(1 -  A) =  0.1/(1  -  0.2)  =  0.125. Note  that 
the sum of the exponents is 0.875 <  1, which indicates  that output has 
decreasing  returns  to balanced  increases in L and R. This result stems 
from classical Ricardian  diminishing  returns  in the face of limited sup- 
plies of land. 
THE  SIMPLEST  LTG  MODEL.  An explicit solution  for the model can 
be obtained  for the non-Malthusian  case in which population  growth  is 
constant at rate n. To be faithful  to the LTG models, assume that there 
is no technological  change [h =  the rate of growth of H  =  (daH,ht)IH,  = 
0]. Taking  the logarithmic  derivative  of equation  5 and  using  the assump- 
tion about  resource  use in equation  4 yields 
(6)  g =  -[1  -  f/(1  -  A)]n -  [A/(1 -  A)  I 
where g is the growth  of output  per capita. This shows that per capita 
output  growth  is the sum of two negative  terms. The first  negative  term 
is the drag  on per capita  growth  given by diminishing  returns.  The sec- 
ond is the drag  from  exhaustible  resources. Hence, in this simple  exam- 
ple of non-Malthusian  demography,  living standards  decline under  the 
weight  of diminishing  returns  on land  and  depletion  of natural  resources. 
Decline is inevitable,  although  it might  be slower  if resources  were abun- 
dant,  population  growth  were slow, or if nonlabor  inputs  were unimpor- 
tant  in production. 
Lethal  Conditions 
Like LTG models, the general  model given in the last section shows 
the tendency toward economic decline. In addition, there are no less 
than  four conditions, each of which is satisfied  in the LTG model, that 
will lead  to ultimate  economic stagnation,  decline, or collapse.  19  All four 
19. In general,  I have ignored  the fascination  shown in Limits  II for overshooting.  In 
multi-equation  difference  equations  of the kind  used in LTG models, overshooting  will 12  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
conditions  depend on the absence of either general  or resource-saving 
technological  change. Some of these depend upon some inputs being 
"essential,"  which is defined  as an input  whose elasticity  of substitution 
in production  with other  factors is less than  one.20 
A return  to the Dark  Ages or worse is unavoidable  under  each of the 
four following conditions. For the first three models, I will assume no 
pollution  exists, while for the fourth model, I will introduce  pollution 
into the analysis. 
Lethal Condition  1.  With  no other binding  constraints  and essential 
natural  resources, the economy runs out of gas and can find no substi- 
tutes.  This implies that the share of resources  (A)  ->  1, so the output 
growth  rate tends to the growth  of resources, -  ,u  (as long as n >  -  R). 
That is, the asymptotic  growth  rate of output  equals the rate of decline 
of inputs  of the essential natural  resource. 
Lethal Condition  2.  If land is essential for food production,  then the 
share  of land (F) ->  1. Thus output  growth  tends to 0 and  per capita  out- 
put grows at - n. This is the classical case of diminishing  returns. 
Lethal Condition  3.  In the Malthusian  case, assume that population 
growth  responds  positively to higher  levels of income. This produces  a 
low-level trap  in which population  is endogenous  and  tends to that  level 
at which the marginal  product  of labor  equals the subsistence wage. If, 
in addition,  there  are essential natural  resources  (as in Lethal  Condition 
1), then the population  that can be supported  at the subsistence wage 
declines along  the path  to ultimate  extinction. 
Lethal Condition  4.  Next, introduce pollution and global environ- 
mental variables. These models are much more complicated  because 
they involve multiple  outputs  and questions  of the extent of internaliza- 
represent  the presence  of oscillatory  solutions,  reflecting  imaginary  roots  to the character- 
istic equation.  Given  the size of the model,  a large  number  of imaginary  roots-and there- 
fore the presence  of overshooting-is not surprising. 
20. An input  that is essential  is one in which  there  is a positive minimum  amount  re- 
quired  per  unit  of output.  For  example,  assume  that  the constant-returns-to-scale  unit  pro- 
duction  function  is of the  form  1 =  F(k,  m), where  k  and  m  are  the capital  and  labor  require- 
ments  per unit  of output.  As capital  increases,  less labor  will be required.  As the amount 
of capital  tends to infinity,  and if the labor  requirement  tends to some m* > 0, then  labor 
is "essential."  If m* -O 0 as k -*  oo,  then labor is "inessential." For production functions 
that  have constant  and  equal  elasticities  of substitution  between  factors,  if the elasticities 
are less than  one, each factor  is essential;  on the other  hand,  if the elasticities  of substitu- 
tion  are  greater  than  or equal  to one, no factor  is essential. William  D. Nordhaus  13 
tion of the externality.  In the simplest  "flow  pollution  model"  sketched 
in equation  2, the analysis  is simply  an extension of the limited  resource 
models  in Lethal  Conditions  1 and  2. 
A more interesting  case comes for stock externalities.  Take the case 
in which a pollutant  is emitted  in fixed proportions  with output  (this be- 
ing "essential"  pollution).  The pollutant  accumulates,  but is slowly re- 
moved by natural  processes. Finally, a catastrophic  threshold  exists, 
above which the pollutant  has unacceptable  impacts  upon  human  socie- 
ties (the civilian equivalent  of nuclear  winter). The constraints  on the 
system can then be rewritten  as 
dPldt  = vY -  otP 
P'P*, 
where  P is the stock pollutant,  v is the fixed  emissions-output  ratio, a is 
the natural  rate of removal  of the pollutant,  and P* is the catastrophic 
threshold.  This system leads to a maximum  sustainable  output, Y*,  of 
Y* =  a-P*/v. 
If population  is growing,  this would  lead to an asymptotic  decline in per 
capita output at the rate of growth of population.  Moreover, the only 
technological  change that would prevent  the dismal  outcome would be 
pollution-saving  technological change. For example, if a catastrophic 
reaction were to occur from a doubling  of carbon dioxide concentra- 
tions, and  if no improvements  in the current  C02-output ratio  were pos- 
sible, then (given the parameters  of the climate system) world output 
would  ultimately  be constrained  to slightly  above today's level.21 None 
of the predicates  of this argument  has been shown to be realistic. How- 
ever, the example  illustrates  Lethal  Condition  4 well. 
WHY  SENSITIVITY  ANALYSES  DO  NOT  MATTER.  The LTG studies 
contain  a number  of "sensitivity  runs"  that  ask whether  the lethal  limits 
to growth  can be avoided. The runs  include  removing  the pollution  lim- 
21. A doubling  of CO2  concentrations  would  lead to an increase  in concentrations  of 
about  600  billion  tons of carbon  (P* = 600  billion  tons carbon);  emissions  are  today  about 
6 billion  tons  annually,  of which  two-thirds  are  immediately  lodged  in the  atmosphere  with 
a residence  time  of about 120  years. With  these parameters,  the steady-state  viable  emis- 
sions would be about  7.5 billion  tons per year, or about one-quarter  more than today's 
level. I present  a more  extensive  discussion  of optimal  growth  with  catastrophic  externali- 
ties in a forthcoming  work  (Nordhaus,  forthcoming). 14  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
its, doubling  the stock of natural  resources, doubling  agricultural  pro- 
duction, and similar  tests. It can be seen immediately,  without any as- 
sistance from supercomputers,  that these strategies do not get at the 
heart  of any of the four  lethal  conditions.  It is hardly  surprising  that  dead 
rabbits  are pulled out of the hat when nothing  but dead bunnies have 
been put in. 
In addition,  this catalogue  of lethal  conditions  can easily obscure  the 
basic point  that  comes from  examining  complex  growth  models-which 
is that there is no general  conclusion. Long-run  growth  trends depend 
upon the growth of inputs, the rate and direction of technological 
change, and the elasticities of substitution  among  the different  factors. 
Until we have secure knowledge  about all these factors, no magic for- 
mula  or supercomputer  can  foretell  whether  growth  or stagnation  will be 
the victor in the race between technological  change and resource scar- 
cities. 
Critiques of the Club of Rome Models  I and II 
The dire forecasts of the LTG school were not well received by the 
economics community.  While  this computerized  dirge  for industrializa- 
tion would probably  have found sympathetic  ears among the classical 
economists of the early nineteenth  century, modern  economists have a 
different  view of the dynamics  of economic growth and found little to 
agree with in the LTG models.22  The criticisms  of Limits  I were exten- 
sive. Moreover,  because Limits  II is virtually  identical  to the 1972  vin- 
tage, the earlier  analyses carry  over time to the updated  version without 
spoilage.  The major  shortcomings  include  the following: 
*  Equations  and  definitions  of variables  seem to have been invented 
de novo instead  of building  on existing  scientific  knowledge.  In Limits  I, 
no attempt  was made to estimate  the behavioral  equations  econometri- 
cally, although  some attempt  seems to have  been made  to calibrate  some 
of the equations,  such as the population  equation,  to available  data. 
* The production  structure  is pessimistic, particularly  with respect 
to the "essential"  nature  of different  inputs.  There  is no substitution  be- 
tween abundant  inputs  and limited  factors, such as the severely limited 
natural  resource  of land. No pollution  abatement  was allowed in Limits 
22. See Beckerman  (1972),  Solow (1974),  and  Nordhaus  (1973a). William  D. Nordhaus  15 
I, although  it is possible in Limits II to reallocate capital to pollution- 
abatement  activities. 
*  Both models rule out ongoing technological change. In this re- 
spect, they are inconsistent with the standard  interpretation  of eco- 
nomic  history  during  the capitalist  era.23 
*  Both  models  are  enormously  complex, with a variety  of nonlineari- 
ties and  lags. In light  of developments  in the understanding  of nonlinear 
systems over the last twenty years, it seems apparent  that the dynamic 
behavior  of the enormously  complicated  Limits I model was not fully 
understood (or even understandable)  by anyone, either authors or 
critics.24 
LIMITS  OVERTURNED  ON  THE  SIMPLE  GROWTH  MODEL.  I showed 
above that  the "lethal"  nature  of economic growth  in Limits  I and  II can 
be reproduced  in simple  growth  models. I will now show how the entire 
argument  can be reversed with a simple change in the specification  of 
the model;  more  precisely, I will introduce  technological  change  into the 
production structure and assume that the Cobb-Douglas  production 
function  accurately  represents  the technological  possibilities  for substi- 
tution. I use lower-case Greek symbols to express the conventional 
Cobb-Douglas production function  (one in which the exponents  or elas- 
ticities of the previous  model are now constant). Hence the production 
function  in equation  3 is written  as Y =  H LX  RI Ty  Kb for the conven- 
tional Cobb-Douglas  case, in which the parameters  w, X, y, and 8 are 
constant and sum to one. To introduce  technological  change, assume 
that  there  is Hicks-neutral  technological  change  at rate  h. After suitable 
transformation,  this changes  equation  6 to the following: 
(7)  g =  -[I  -  w/(l  -  8)]n -  XR/(l -  8) +  hl(l  -  8), 
where  g is the growth  of output  per worker.  Then output  per capita  can 
grow  as long as 
(8)  h >  (I  -  8  )n + A>. 
To use parameters  that  are consistent  with historical  growth,  again  take 
the values of w =  0.6,  X =  0.1,  and 8  =  0.2.  With n  =  0.01 and R = 
23. See particularly  Kuznets  (1977),  Maddison  (1982),  and  Denison  (1962,  1967). 
24. To the authors'  credit,  and unlike  most models, it was extremely  carefully  docu- 
mented;  see Meadows  and  others  (1974). 16  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
0.005, to offset the drag  from  resources  and  diminishing  returns,  techno- 
logical  change  must satisfy the following: 
(9)  h > (0.2)0.01  +  (0.1)0.005  =  0.0025. 
That is, technological  change must exceed one-quarter  of 1 percent a 
year  to overcome  the growth  drag  in this simple  case. Historical  rates  of 
total  factor  productivity,  h, in developed  countries  have been on the or- 
der of 0.01 to 0.02, which is well in excess of the rate required  to offset 
resource  exhaustion  and  diminishing  returns.25 
The discussion  to this point  and  a careful  study  of the simplified  LTG- 
type model  lead  to one conclusion  that  was not always  clear  in the earlier 
debate  about  growth  limits.  While  the LTG  school argued  that  economic 
decline was inevitable  and economists argued  that the LTG argument 
was fallacious, the argument  is ultimately  an empirical  matter.  Put dif- 
ferently,  critics  would  have gone too far  had  they claimed  that  the postu- 
lated pessimistic scenario  could not hold. Perhaps  the LTG school had 
little appreciation  for the invisible  hand. On the other  hand,  even a per- 
fectly functioning  price  system could not prevent  ultimate  economic de- 
cline if any of the "lethal  conditions"  analyzed above were to hold. A 
price system can signal  absolute  scarcity  but cannot  prevent  it. 
Ultimately, then, the debate about future of economic growth  is an 
empirical  one, and  resolving  the debate  will require  analysts  to examine 
fundamental  structural  parameters  of the economy. Several critical  is- 
sues must  be examined.  How large  are the drags  from  natural  resources 
and land? What  is the quantitative  relationship  between technological 
change  and  the resource-land  drag?  How does human  population  growth 
behave as incomes rise? How much substitution  is possible between la- 
bor  and  capital  on the one hand,  and scarce natural  resources,  land, and 
pollution abatement  on the other? These are empirical  questions that 
cannot  be settled solely by theorizing. 
Modeling Complex Systems 
A major  question  must be addressed  in evaluating  complex models: 
how robust  are their properties  with respect to changes in parameters, 
25. Total  factor  productivity  estimates  for different  regions  are contained  in Denison 
(1962,  1967)  and  Maddison  (1982). William  D. Nordhaus  17 
initial conditions, or specifications?  One of the unwarranted  assump- 
tions of the original  LTG  model  was that  the anti-growth  school had suf- 
ficient understanding  of the world's underlying  economic and demo- 
graphic  behavior that they could make reasonably  reliable  judgments 
about  the structure  and behavior  of a world model. An example of this 
self-confidence  was the following  passage  in Limits  I: 
We have tried in every doubtful  case to make the most optimistic  estimate of 
unknown  quantities....  We  can thus  say with  some confidence  that, under  the 
assumptions  of no major  change in the present system, population  and indus- 
trial  growth  will  certainly  stop within  the next century,  at the latest.26 
At the time the original  work was undertaken,  critics argued that, 
contrary  to the modelers'  claims, the results  were not robust  to changes 
in specification.  One example  of sensitivity  to specification  was shown 
in the last section, where the introduction  of technological  change al- 
tered  the outcome completely. Returning  to equation  8, define  h* as the 
threshold  level of h where per capita  growth  is zero, that is, h* =  (1 - 
w  -  6)n  +  XR,  . The behavior  of the economy  changes  dramatically 
around  the threshold  value of h*. For h slightly  below h*, human  socie- 
ties decay to extinction, while for values of h above h*, living  standards 
grow indefinitely. 
More generally, developments in the mathematics  of complex sys- 
tems have advanced tremendously  in the last two decades. It is now 
understood  that nonlinear  systems of the kind presented in the LTG 
models can behave in surprisingly  rich and complicated  fashions, and 
that  behavior  is sensitive to small  changes  in specifications,  parameters, 
or initial  conditions.  These developments  go by such names  as "chaos" 
and  "catastrophe."  The mathematical  message  is that  nonlinear  dynami- 
cal systems are even more  sensitive to specifications  than  was generally 
understood  two decades ago. 
The difficulties  of understanding  the behavior of even the simplest 
nonlinear  systems can be illustrated  with a Malthusian  growth  model in 
the spirit  of LTG  models. For simplicity,  assume that  there  is no capital 
formation,  no pollution,  no technological  change, and no limitations  on 
natural  resources. The limits of importance  are diminishing  returns  to 
labor inputs and a Malthusian  population  structure. Assume that the 
production  function  is one in which output, Y,  (which also equals con- 
26. Limits I (p. 126).  Emphasis  in original. 18  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
sumption),  is a function  of lagged  labor  inputs,  L,; for concreteness, ex- 
amine  a quadratic  approximation  of the function 
(10)  Yt=  01Lt  -02Lt 
where 0, and 02 are structural  coefficients. 
The demographic  structure  is an overlapping  generations  model in 
which  each generation  spans  three  periods  of life-childhood,  the work- 
ing years, and retirement.  In the spirit  of Malthus,  the birth  rate, B,  is 
an increasing  function  of income, which is linearized  as follows: 
(11)  B,=P(Y)=  O+  Y, 
Hence labor  inputs  are given by 
(12)  L, =  Bt_ . 
This model resembles  the structure  of the LTG  models in its Malthu- 
sian nature  and would seem to be straightforward  to analyze. Surpris- 
ingly, this system behaves chaotically  for some values of the parame- 
ters. Figure 1 shows the behavior  of output  per capita  for three  different 
cases. In all cases, the beginning  of the trajectory  is exponential  growth; 
this is the region  before diminishing  returns  have set in. In case A, the 
curve shows simple exponential  growth  throughout  the region. Case B 
shows an alternative  set of parameters  in which growth  begins along  an 
exponential  trajectory  and  then oscillates in a regular  fashion. Case C is 
the most interesting.  Here the behavior  is "chaotic,"  in the sense that  no 
recurrence  or regular  behavior  occurs. The system fluctuates  between 
the limits in no predictable  fashion. Further  examination  of this simple 
model  shows the inherent  unpredictability  of future  outcomes, as shown 
by the extreme  sensitivity  to initial  conditions  of the paths  of output  and 
consumption  for case C.27 
The point  of this example  is to remind  us to be humble  about  our  abil- 
ity not only to predict  but even to understand  the behavior  of complex 
nonlinear  systems like those in LTG models-or  even in much simpler 
growth  models. Given  the complexity  of the underlying  system, the lack 
of any attempt  to estimate the equations  from actual data, and the ab- 
27. Robert  May  (1974)  introduced  the mathematics  of chaotic  population  growth  in  an- 
imal  populations,  while  Richard  Day (1983)  has shown  conditions  under  which  Malthusian 
economics  may exhibit  chaotic  fluctuations. William D.  Nordhaus  19 
Figure  1. Alternative  Growth  Paths  of Output  and Sensitivity  to Specification 
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Source:  Author's  calculations.  In case  A,  01  =  1.04 and 02  =  0. In case  B,  01  =  3.5 and 02  =  3.5.  In case  C, 
01  =4.0andO2  =  4.1. 
sence of any systematic  analysis of the properties or robustness  of the 
LTG models, it is difficult to share the confidence of the modelers in the 
robustness of their long-term predictions. 
Overall  Economic  Performance  since  1970 
One of the major points that has emerged up to now is that the exist- 
ence and significance of constraints to long-term economic  growth, im- 
posed either by environmental concerns or natural resource limitations, 
cannot be determined by the kinds of theoretical  models developed  in 
Limits I or II. Indeed,  it is hard to see how even  the best of economic 
models could do more than frame the questions for empirical studies to 
address. Thus in the balance of this study,  I will examine insights that 
economists  have gathered from actual economic  growth over  the last 
twenty years. What have events in the "real economy" and in social and 
natural sciences  revealed  about the empirical issues  that underpin the 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Table  1. Growth  Rate of U.S. Labor  Productivity,  1874-1989 
Percent  per year 
Total  Private 
Period  private  nonfarm  Manufacturing 
1874-1884  3.1  4.2  1.0 
1884-1900  1.4  1.2  2.2 
1900-1913  1.7  1.9  2.2 
1913-1929  2.3  2.4  3.4 
1929-1948  2.4  2.1  1.7 
1948-1973  2.9  2.4  2.9 
1973-1989  0.9  0.7  2.6 
Source: Kendrick  (1961),  U.S. Department  of Commerce  (1966),  and U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Monthly 
Labor  Review  (various  issues). Average  annual  growth  is measured  as output  per person-hour. 
LTG debate? In this section, I will examine overall economic perfor- 
mance. In subsequent sections, I will evaluate studies of individual 
sectors. 
The period since 1973  has not been a happy one for most advanced 
industrial  countries. Estimates  by Angus Maddison  suggest  that output 
per capita  has grown  by 1.6 percent  a year during  the "capitalist"  epoch 
from 1820  to the present.28  But, as is well known, the growth  of produc- 
tivity and  living  standards  has slowed down substantially  in all major  in- 
dustrial  countries  in the last two decades. Table 1 shows data on labor 
productivity  growth  in the private  economy, the private  nonfarm  econ- 
omy, and  in manufacturing  going  back  to the 1870s  and  ending  at the last 
business cycle peak in 1989.  The performance  over the last two decades 
has been well below that of any major  subperiod  for both the total pri- 
vate economy and the private  nonfarm  economy. In manufacturing,  re- 
cent performance  has been close to par, although  the data for the last 
decade are partially  buoyed by the use of hedonic  indexes (particularly 
for computers)  that were not applied to similar  major  product-quality 
improvements  in earlier  years.29 
Are these the early warning  signs of a resource-limited  growth  slow- 
down? Estimates of the sources of the productivity  slowdown in the 
United States attribute  some of the slowdown to generalized  "deple- 
tion." In surveys of the productivity  slowdown, two specific sources of 
the slowdown seem to relate to LTG-type  resource  exhaustion. First is 
28. Maddison  (1982,  p. 6)). 
29. See Baily  and  Gordon  (1988). William D.  Nordhaus  21 
Table  2. Productivity  Trends  in Extractive  Industries 
Percent  per year 
Sector  1939-47  1947-65  1965-73  1973-89 
Iron mining  1.5  3.6  3.7  4.3 
Copper  mining  1.8  3.4  -0.3  6.0 
Coal mining  1.2  6.1  -  1.0  3.4 
Nonmetallic  minerals  ...  ...  4.0  1.2 
Petroleum  and natural  gas  .  .  .  3.5a  4.3  - 3.5 
Nonfarm  business  1.9  2.6  2.0  0.7 
Source: Kendrick  (1961),  U.S. Department  of Commerce  (1966),  and U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Monthly 
Labor  Review  (various  issues). Average  annual  growth  is measured  as output  per person-hour. 
a.  1959-65. 
the literal  exhaustion  of high-grade  oil, gas, and other natural  resources 
(although  this exhaustion is sometimes offset by new discoveries and 
technological  change). As countries are forced to move to higher-cost 
sources of energy  or to substitute  other  inputs  for low-cost fuels, the net 
output  of the economy will decline. A second source  of the slowdown  is 
the need to divert some of the productive  capacity of the economy to 
reduce  pollution  or to clean up wastes from  past pollution. 
Along  with  Edward  Denison, John  Kendrick,  Martin  Neil Baily, Rob- 
ert J. Gordon, Charles L. Schultze, and other economists, I have at- 
tempted to estimate the source of the productivity slowdown in the 
United States.30  Currently,  economists believe that a wide variety of 
sources  are involved. Studies suggest  that "depletion"  is responsible  for 
around  one-quarter  percentage  point a year of the 1.5 percentage  point 
slowdown  in labor  productivity  from 1948-73 to 1973-80. No estimates 
exist for the most recent period, but the role of depletion  is likely to be 
considerably  smaller,  given the decline in energy prices and the lower 
growth  in pollution  control  expenditures. 
Can  depletion  of high-grade  or low-cost resources  be discerned  in the 
productivity  trends?  Unless offset by technology, depletion  of low-cost 
resources  implies  that  more conventional  resources (capital,  labor, and 
materials)  will be required  to extract oil, copper, and other exhaustible 
resources; thus conventional productivity measures will grow more 
slowly or even decline. Table 2 shows productivity  trends  in the major 
extractive  industries.  Note that the measure  used-output  per person- 
30. See Denison  (1985),  Kendrick  (1961),  Nordhaus  (1982),  Baily and  Gordon  (1988), 
and  Baily  and  Schultze  (1990). 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
hour-has  major  shortcomings  for extractive industries  because these 
industries  are highly  capital-intensive;  moreover,  accounting  for deple- 
tion effects is a complicated  procedure  that has not been attempted  in 
most productivity  studies. Nonetheless, underlying  trends  are probably 
reasonably  well gauged  by labor  productivity.  The period  from 1965  to 
1973  showed a dismal  productivity  record  for copper and coal mining. 
The  period  from 1973  to 1989  shows a dramatic  drop  in the labor  produc- 
tivity in crude oil and natural  gas production.3'  On the whole, the last 
decade  exhibits  productivity  improvements  in extractive  industries  that 
are above the average  of the nonfarm  business sector. 
In summary,  evidence is mixed as to whether the exhaustion of re- 
sources has contributed  to the productivity  slowdown in recent years. 
Clearly, the United States has experienced a significant  slowdown in 
measured  aggregate  productivity  growth  in the last two decades. In ex- 
tractive  industries,  trends  for productivity  have been mixed. But  extrac- 
tive industries  are only a small fraction of total output; mining  repre- 
sented less than 3 percent of real GNP in 1979.32  Given the share of 
extractive industries  and the mixed trends  for productivity  in those in- 
dustries,  I conclude  that  only a small  fraction  of the aggregate  productiv- 
ity slowdown  can be attributed  to the exhaustion  of natural  resources. 
Long-term Trends in Resource Prices 
Another way of looking at the evidence of scarcity of natural  re- 
sources is to examine the long-run  trends of resource prices, focusing 
again on market or appropriated  goods. If appropriable  natural re- 
sources were becoming  scarcer, markets  would signal  this by a run-up 
in their  relative  prices. In examining  prices, the most revealing  trend  is 
actually the relative movements in factor prices, rather  than trends in 
product  prices. 
The impact  of scarcity  on prices can be illustrated  by returning  to the 
general  production-function  model  in equation  3. Let factor  rental  prices 
31. For petroleum  and natural  gas, productivity  growth  from 1973  to 1989  was ex- 
tremely  erratic,  with a decline  of 9.3 percent  a year  from 1973  to 1982,  followed  by a rise 
in labor  productivity  at 3.2 percent  a year  from  1982  to 1989.  (U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statis- 
tics, Monthly Labor Review, March 1992, p. 10). 
32.  Economic Report to the President,  1987 (p. 257). William  D. Nordhaus  23 
be given by qi, which is the nominal  price of factor i in period t, where 
i = L, R, T, and K. Then the factor price of resources relative  to labor 
is given by 
(13)  qRqL  A, L,tIf,R,, 
with the analogous  equation  holding  for land  and capital  services. 
Equation  13  tells an important  story  about  the interplay  between  rela- 
tive scarcity of natural  resources, technological trends, and relative 
prices. Begin  by assuming  that  the factor shares  are constant  (so that A, 
and  Q, are constants over time). In this case, because labor  is growing 
relative to land or other natural  resources, resource and land prices 
should be rising  relative to the price of labor. However, technological 
change might  be resource-saving,  reducing  the amount  of resource in- 
puts required  per unit  labor  at given factor  prices. In this case, the share 
parameters  might  be moving  sufficiently  to offset the resource  scarcity, 
thereby  offsetting  the tendency  to increase  relative  resource  prices. 
In other words, resource  and land  prices will be rising  relative  to the 
price of labor, unless technological  change is biased toward  saving re- 
sources or land so as to offset the relative decline in those inputs. The 
prices of the scarce factor can only be falling  relative to the abundant 
factor  if the output  elasticities are shifting  in such a way as to offset the 
relative  decline in the scarce factor. In particular,  declining  relative  re- 
source prices can occur if the elasticities of substitution  among  inputs 
are  less than  unity  and  technological  change  is resource-saving  and  land- 
saving.33 
What  in fact have been the trends  in the prices of resources relative 
to the price  of labor  (call  these the "real  input  prices")?  Figures  2 through 
6 present some of the most important  examples. Figure 2 shows the 
prices of two key energy resources, petroleum  and coal, from 1870  to 
1989. The real input price of energy of these resources declined from 
1880  to 1970  by a factor of between 5 and 6.5. A decline in a factor of 5 
33. As an example,  assume  that  there  are two factors,  labor  and  resources,  which  are 
combined  in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution  (CES)  production  function  of the follow- 
ing  form:  Y,  = F(HR  R,, HL  L4),  where  HL and  HR  are  labor-augmenting  and  resource-aug- 
menting  technological  change,  respectively.  In this specification,  technological  change  is 
assumed  to be purely  factor-augmenting.  If resource-augmenting  technological  change  is 
sufficiently  rapid  so that  HRI  R,  is growing  faster  than  H,L  L, even though  R,  is growing  more 
slowly  than  L, then  the price  of resources  will be declining  relative  to the price  of labor. 24  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure  2. Real Prices  of Energy  Products  in the United  States, 1870-1989 
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Source: Author's  calculations  based  on Manthy  (1978,  p. 11);  Statistical  Abstract of the United States,  1991 (table 
669, p. 408, and table 1221,  p. 698);  and U.S. Bureau  of the Census  (1975,  pp. 165, 169-70). Real  price  is an index 
of the product  price  divided  by an index  of average  hourly  earnings  in manufacturing. 
over a century represents an average annual  decline of 1.6 percent a 
year. Since 1970,  however, no further  decline in the real input  price of 
the energy resources has occurred;  prices increased  sharply  after 1973 
and  then declined  during  the 1980s. 
Figure 3 shows the real input prices for four major mineral re- 
sources-copper,  iron ore, lead, and zinc. The general trend in these 
prices has been downward  during  this century. Copper  experienced a 
sharp  decline  until 1950,  but  has declined  relatively  little since that  time. 
The trend  in iron ore and lead looks much like the trend  in real energy 
products,  with a decline through  1970  but no significant  further  decline 
since then. Real zinc input  prices have risen sharply  since 1970.  Taking 
the trend  over the last century,  real  input  prices of these four  major  min- 
erals have fallen  by between 1.6 and 2.4 percent  a year. 
Figure  4 shows the prices  of four  minor  minerals-ones with  a shorter 
period  of use or less data. All four show significant  declines in real  input 
prices from  their  levels early in the century;  the average  annual  decline 
in real  input  prices  ranges  from 1.3  to 2.9 percent  a year. With  the excep- 
tion of molybdenum,  the prices show a tendency to decline until 1970; 
after  then, their  movement  has been less regular. William D.  Nordhaus  25 
Figure  3. Real Prices  of Major  Minerals  in the United  States, 1870-1989 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on  Manthy  (1978,  p.  114); Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States,  1991 
(table  669, p. 408, table 1221,  p. 698, and table 1241,  p. 707);  and U.S. Bureau  of the Census  (1975,  pp. 165, 169- 
70, 599, and 602-03). Real price  is an index  of the product  price  divided  by an index  of average  hourly  earnings  in 
manufacturing. 
Figure  4. Real Prices  of Minor  Minerals  in the United  States, 1920-89 
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Source: Author's  calculations  based  on Manthy  (1978,  pp. 114  and 124);  Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States, 
1991  (table  669, p. 408, table 1217,  p. 696, and table 1252,  p. 710);  and U.S. Bureau  of the Census  (1975,  pp. 165, 
169-70, and 605). Real price is an index of the product  price divided  by an index of average  hourly  earnings  in 
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Figure 5.  Real Prices of Other Resources in the United States,  1870-1989 
Real price index, 1989  =  100 
Logarithmic  scale 
5000 
_  ,  ~~~Silver 
1000 
1  00  -a 
1870  1890  i  /  Stumpage  l 
1870  1890  1910  1930  1950  1970  1989 
Source: Author's  calculations  based on Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States,  1991 (table  669,  p.  408,  table 
1188,  p. 680, and  table 1221,  p. 698);  U.S. Bureau  of the Census  (1975,  pp. 165, 169-70, 547,  and  606);  and Lindhert 
(1988,  table 1, pp. 49-51). Real  price  is an index  of the product  price  divided  by an index  of average  hourly  earnings 
in manufacturing. 
Figure  5 shows the trends  in three other important  resources. Silver 
prices reflect trends  in precious metals. It is probably  a better index of 
resource  scarcity  than  gold, which  has been pegged  by governments  and 
has contained  fetishistic value over the ages (although  both of these in- 
fluences have recently  declined in importance).  Real silver input  prices 
have been highly  volatile but-with  the exception of the bubble  during 
the 1980s  when the Hunt brothers  tried to corner the silver market- 
have shown  no trend  since 1940. 
The two other prices in figure 5 contain the major surprises  in the 
data. The first  is the price of land-Lindert's series on the price of U.S. 
farmland-which is a good proxy  for the price  of undeveloped  land.  This 
series is the only one that appears  to remove the influence  of structures 
in a satisfactory  manner.34  Contrary  to folk wisdom,35  relative  farmland 
34. Lindert  (1988). 
35. In particular,  a saying  of Will  Rogers  comes to mind:  "Land  is a good investment; 
they ain't  making  it no more." William D.  Nordhaus  27 
Figure  6. Alternative  Measures  of Real Farmland  Prices  in the United  States, 1860-1986 
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Source: Author's  calculations  based  on Lindert  (1988,  table 1, pp. 49-51) and U.S. Bureau  of the Census  (various 
years; 1975,  pp. 165, 169-70).  Real  price  is an index  of the farmland  price  divided  by an index  of the wage rate. 
prices have actually  declined  over the last century, with an average  de- 
cline since 1890  of 0.8 percent a year. The decline ceased after 1940. 
Since that  time the real  input  price of land  has increased  modestly. 
Because the trend  in land  prices runs  so counter  to folk wisdom, I ex- 
amined  farmland  prices for different  years. I calculated the prices by 
state for 1860, 1870, 1910, and 1986 and constructed fixed-weight  in- 
dexes using  early  weights  (from  1860),  late weights  (from  1986),  and  cur- 
rent  weights. Figure  6 shows the results  and  a comparison  with  the Lind- 
ert price data. Not surprisingly,  the 1986-weighted  index rises much 
more  quickly  than  the current-weight  index, so the land-labor  price  ratio 
falls more slowly. However, even with this correction,  land prices fall 
relative  to wages for every index since 1860. 
The other surprise  is the price of "stumpage,"  which is the price of 
standing  timber.  It appears  that stumpage  prices have actually  risen sig- 
nificantly  over this century. From 1910  to 1986, the real input price of 
stumpage  has risen by 1.5 percent  a year. Most of the rise has occurred 
since 1970.36 
What  overall  conclusions  can be drawn  from  these data  on long-term 
36. The data  on land  and  stumpage  prices  suffer  from  measurement  problems  that  are 
much  more  severe  than  those for the other  resources.  These two inputs  are  highly  hetero- 
genous and  intrinsically  immobile.  Few serious  index-number  problems  arise  in creating 
a price  index  for silver, which  has a conventional  purity  standard  and  low transportation 
costs. By contrast,  the data  for  land  and  stumpage  are  incomplete,  particularly  for the ear- 
lier years;  cover only part  of the nation;  and  are  estimates,  rather  than  transaction  prices. 28  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
price trends?  First, the data  indicate  that over the last century,  from an 
economic point of view, resources  have become less scarce than  labor. 
With  the exception of stumpage,  all resource  prices have shown a sig- 
nificant  drop in real prices over this century. Second, a break in this 
trend  seems to have occurred  around  1970.  With  the exception  of copper 
and  molybdenum,  all real  resource  prices have either  been either  stable 
or rising  since 1970.  Third,  a generalized  increase  in the relative  scarcity 
of resources  does not seem to have occurred  to date. Over the last two 
decades, sharp  increases in real input  prices occurred  only for zinc and 
stumpage.  Fourth,  in the most recent  decade, from 1980  to 1989,  the rel- 
ative prices of resources have actually  declined, with real prices falling 
for all resources  except zinc and  phosphorus.  However, the last decade 
is probably  heavily influenced  by cyclical conditions  and should  not be 
weighted  too heavily. 
In short, the data on real input resource prices do not indicate that 
major  appropriable  resources have taken a major  turn  toward scarcity 
during  the last century. 
Direct Studies of the Drag on Economic Growth 
The studies of the last two sections are backward-looking.  They im- 
ply that  resources  have been but a small  drag  on growth  to date and  that 
technological  change has overwhelmed  the small drag. But what about 
the future?  Is the power of exponential  growth of population, energy 
use, and pollution  leading  humanity  into an inevitable  rendezvous  with 
catastrophe? 
Projecting  future  trends  and the potential  future  drag  from  resources 
is qualitatively  different  from assessing past growth  trends. We do not 
know the evolution of the economy; we must construct  economic and 
scientific models of poorly understood  phenomena;  and we may well 
overlook the ultimate  threats  (a plague  of viruses or a collision with an 
enormous  meteorite?)  as we debate  other  concerns, such as greenhouse 
warming  or species depletion. 
At the same time, serious research  efforts have been undertaken  to 
project  future  developments;  these studies  can  form  the basis  for an esti- 
mate  of the future  drag  on growth  from  resources. More  specifically,  an- 
alysts have conducted  a number  of sectoral  studies  of growth  limits. The William D.  Nordhaus  29 
major  areas  of study are energy  and  entropy,  nonfuel  minerals,  land, air 
and water  pollution,  and the greenhouse  effect. I will briefly  sketch the 
results  of these studies. 
Before I discuss the measurements,  a word  is in order  about  the defi- 
nition  of output  that  I use below. In principle,  national  output  should  be 
measured  as true national  income, TNI, which is real national  output, 
including  appropriately  measured  consumption,  plus the value  of net ac- 
cumulations  or decumulations  of all capital. In all cases, consumption 
and capital  accumulation  are defined  as the relevant  flows valued with 
the appropriate  social shadow  prices;  moreover,  the capital  flows should 
include  physical, human,  technical, research, and environmental  capi- 
tal. Under  certain  very restrictive  conditions,  this definition  of TNI cor- 
responds  to an appropriate  measure  of economic welfare.  The literature 
on new approaches  to measuring  true national  income is burgeoning; 
however, stating  the definition  is sufficient  for the purpose  at hand. It is 
important to recognize, however, that evaluating TNI is  relatively 
straightforward  for appropriable  goods and services where market 
prices reflect  appropriate  social valuations.  By contrast,  for inappropri- 
able  goods and  services (or  more  accurately,  for inappropriated  goods or 
ones with incomplete  property  rights), market  prices do not accurately 
reflect  social valuations,  and most of the difficulty  is to decide on an ap- 
propriate  valuation. 
The methodology  of estimating  the drag on economic growth is to 
compare  the impact  on true  national  income  in a "limited"  case in which 
resources are constrained  with an "unlimited"  case in which resources 
are superabundant  (but  not free).37  The "growth  drag"  is then the differ- 
ence between the unlimited  and  the limited  cases. The growth  drag  may 
arise  because either  appropriable  or inappropriable  inputs  are limited  in 
supply. For example, resources of low-cost oil, high-grade  copper, 
clean air or water, or pristine  recreational  sites may be limited. As the 
economy grows, these limited resources become more scarce and the 
37. The counterfactual  assumption  that is made in the "unlimited"  case is that re- 
sources  are  superabundant,  but  not  necessarily  free  at the  existing  price  level of resources. 
Consider  the case of water.  Say that  water  for  irrigation  currently  costs $100  an acre  foot, 
but  the supply  curve  for water  is rising  sharply  because  of the need to go further  or deeper 
to find  more  water.  The counterfactual  or unlimited  case would  arise  if a new technology 
were  discovered  that  could  deliver  desalinized  water  from  the ocean  at a cost equal  to $100 
an  acre  foot. The  supply  curve  in the  unlimited  case would  then  be horizontal  at the current 
price,  reflecting  the  fact that  water  would  be superabundant  at a price  of $100  an acre  foot. 30  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
cost of producing  the same level of satisfaction  increases (or, equiva- 
lently, the output  per bundled  unit  of labor  and  capital  decreases). 
The drag  on growth can be incorporated  into the aggregate  produc- 
tion  function  model  that  I introduced  earlier.  Assume that  output  is pro- 
duced  by a number  of inputs.  The impact  of resource  scarcity  can be es- 
timated  to a first  approximation  by calculating  the impact  of a particular 
scarcity  on the rate  of growth  of real  income. The procedure  can be seen 
by the following.  Assume that  F(R,,  A, t) is the gross output  that can be 
produced  with the services of scarce land, mineral  and environmental 
resources,  Rt, and their substitutes,  At. The time variable,  t, in the pro- 
duction  function  represents  the impacts of changing  exogenous forces 
such as capital,  labor,  and  technology.  The cost of extracting  and  deliv- 
ering  the resource services is C(Rt,  At, t). Net output  in the limits case, 
yL, is therefore 
(14)  YL(Rt,  At, t) =  F(Rt, At, t) -  C(R,  At, t). 
For the unlimited  case, assume that resources are superabundant  at to- 
day's prices; write this symbolically  as R-, indicating  that all resources 
are superabundant  at today's prices and grades. (Note that this applies 
to land and environmental  resources, as well as depletable  natural  re- 
sources.) This implies  that net output  in the unlimited  case in which re- 
sources are superabundant,  Yu,  can be written  as 
(15)  YU(R-, At, 
t) =  F(Roc,  At, 
t) -  C(RO,  At, 
t). 
The difference  between equation 14 and equation 15 is that in equation 
15,  resources  do not become scarcer  and  more  expensive, while in equa- 
tion 14,  the market  price  of the limited  resource  rises because of growing 
scarcity.  Finally,  the drag  on growth  from  resources  is the difference  be- 
tween equations 14 and 15, the levels of true national  income in the un- 
limited  and  limited  cases: 
(16)  Dragt =  YU(RO,  At, t) -  YL(Rt,  At, t). 
In the estimates  that  follow, I will examine  the drag  to economic growth 
from 1980  to 2050. 
Market Goods 
"Market  goods"  are goods for which the social costs and  benefits  are 
captured  in market  transaction-that is, those without  significant  exter- William D.  Nordhaus  31 
Table  3. Estimated  Drag  from Limited  Resources  over the Next Few Decades 
Impact on  Impact on world 
world  output,  growth rate, 
Source of drag  2050a  1980-2050b 
Market  goods 
Nonrenewable  resources 
Energy  fuels  10.3  15.5 
Nonfuel minerals  2.0  2.9 
Entropy  0.0  0.0 
Renewable  resources 
Land  3.6  5.2 
Environmental  goods 
Greenhouse  warming  2.0  2.9 
Local pollutants  3.0  4.4 
Total  19.4  30.9 
Sources: Author's  calculations  using  Nordhaus  (1973a,  1979,  1991b),  Gordon  and  others  (1987),  Georgescu-Roegen 
(1971),  Denison  (1962, 1967),  Cline  (1992),  IPCC  (1990),  and EPA (1990). 
a. Percent. 
b. Basis points  per year. 
nalities  in consumption  or production.  For market  goods, it is generally 
assumed  that market  prices properly  measure  both the marginal  cost to 
producers  and  marginal  valuation  to consumers.  Thus  we can look to the 
changes  in market  prices  to place a value on the impact  of rising  scarcity. 
ENERGY RESOURCES. The most detailed estimate of the drag  from 
growth examines the impact of scarcity of low-cost energy resources. 
The estimate is based on an energy model I constructed  several years 
ago.38  To estimate  the drag  on economic growth,  I calculated  the differ- 
ence between  the economic  growth  rate  with actual  energy  supplies  ver- 
sus a case in which current  (low-cost) fuels were available in infinite 
quantities.  In the first  case, energy prices would be rising, while in the 
second case of superabundance,  relative energy prices would be con- 
stant.39  This study indicated  that  the resource-limited  case would lower 
net output  in the middle  of the next century  by about 10  percent. 
This calculation  is shown in the first  line of table 3. The second col- 
umn shows the estimated output decline for the terminal  year (2050). 
The third  column then converts this to a "growth  drag"  in basis points 
by calculating  the impact  on economic growth  that would be necessary 
38. See especially  Nordhaus  (1973b,  1979). 
39. Technically,  the  counterfactual  assumption  of superabundance  is equivalent  to as- 
suming  that  the  elasticity  of substitution  between  energy  and  other  inputs  becomes  infinite 
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to reduce  terminal  output  by the amount  in the second column. For en- 
ergy  fuels, which  is the largest  single  figure  in  the table, the figure  is 0. 155 
percent  a year on the growth  rate (or 15.5 basis points a year). 
NONFUEL  MINERALS.  In a study with a number  of my colleagues, 
we applied  the same basic methodology  as just described  for energy to 
nonfuel  minerals;  we used copper as a detailed  case study.40  Our  study 
derived  detailed  estimates of the resources and technologies  for deliv- 
ering  "copper  services." Based on this model, we estimated  the impact 
on output  that  would take place if the current  estimates  of copper  avail- 
ability  were replaced  by a hypothetical  discovery of an infinite  source of 
copper available  at 1980  prices. The difference  between the actual and 
the hypothetical  supplies  would constitute  the growth  drag.  This study 
found  that  the difference  between  the superabundant  supply  and  current 
supply  estimates  would  produce  a slowdown  in growth  of about  one ba- 
sis point a year for copper;  by extending  this methodology  to other re- 
source-limited  nonfuel  minerals,  we calculated  an additional  slowdown 
of around  two basis points a year. 
ENTROPY.  One of the hardy  perennials  in the ecological worry gar- 
den concerns the thermodynamic  implications  of economic activity. 
The most thorough  treatment  was a treatise in which Nicholas Georg- 
escu-Roegen  argued  that limitations  of low-entropy  resources will ulti- 
mately bring  down the curtain  on human  civilization.4'  "Entropy"  is a 
technical  term  from  thermodynamics  that measures  the unavailable  en- 
ergy of a closed system.42  For example, by extracting  and  burning  coal, 
the economy is taking  available  energy,  dissipating  it into an unavailable 
source (ambient  heat), and thereby  increasing  entropy.  The term "neg- 
entropy"  (attributed  to the physicist E. Schroedinger)  can be used to 
designate the total energy available  in a system. According  to Georg- 
escu-Roegen: 
[O]ur whole economic life  feeds on low entropy,  to wit, cloth, lumber,  china, 
copper, etc., all of which are highly  ordered  [i.e., negentropic]  structures.... 
Even with a constant population  and a constant flow per capita of mined re- 
sources, mankind's  dowry will ultimately  be exhausted  if the career  of the hu- 
man  species is not brought  to an end earlier  by other  factors.43 
40. Gordon  and  others  (1987). 
41. Georgescu-Roegen  (1971). 
42. The  basic principles  of entropy  can be found  in a physics  textbook  such  as the one 
by Ohanian  (1989). 
43. Georgescu-Roegen  (1971,  pp. 277, 296).  Emphasis  in original. William  D. Nordhaus  33 
Georgescu-Roegen's  gloomy conclusion  is that we must spread  the  jam 
of negentropy  as thinly  as possible on our meager  bread: 
If we abstract  from  other  causes that  may knell  the death  bell of human  species, 
it is clear that natural  resources  represent  the limitative  factor as concerns the 
life span of that species. .  .  And everything  man  has done during  the last two 
hundred  years  or so puts  him  in the position  of a fantastic  spendthrift.  There  can 
be no doubt  about  it: any  use of the natural  resources  for the satisfaction  of non- 
vital needs means  a smaller  quantity  of life in the future.  If we understand  well 
the problem,  the best use of our iron resources  is to produce  plows or harrows 
as they are needed, not Rolls Royces, not even agricultural  tractors.44 
The Georgescu-Roegen  system can be represented  with  the following 
modification  of the model developed earlier.  Output  is given by the fol- 
lowing  production  function: 
(17)  Y, =  min[F(L,, Rt, Tt, K,; He), NOt], 
where Ot is the irreducible human consumption  of negentropy,  q is the 
fixed negentropy  consumption-output  ratio, and other variables  are as 
previously defined. Equation 17 asserts that increasing  entropy (con- 
suming  negentropy)  in the productive  process is an essential  attribute  of 
economic activity. The balance equation  for negentropy  is as follows: 
let N, be the initial stock of negentropy,  with a net inflow (negentropy 
income)  of I, from  solar  energy, minus  dissipation  and  human  consump- 
tion of 0t times a waste factor of Ot.4i The entropic  balance  equation  is 
then 
(18)  Nt =  Nt- I + It -  otOt 
The second law of thermodynamics  holds that  for a closed system, neg- 
entropy  as measured  by Nt must  be running  down. 
How should  our estimate of growth  limitations  account  for entropy? 
In an economy  without  externalities,  no correction  is necessary  because 
the entropy constraint  in equation 18 is already included in the econ- 
omy's technological  constraints  for diverse extraction  and conversion 
activities (just  as, for that matter,  is the law of conservation  of angular 
momentum,  Newton's second law, Boyle's Law, or Einstein's  formula 
on mass and  energy).  Equation  18  is simply  redundant.  It places no addi- 
44. Georgescu-Roegen  (1971,  p. 21). 
45. The  amount  of negentropic  waste in today's  economy  is prodigious.  Flying  the au- 
thor  from  Washington,  D.C., to New Haven  performs  approximately  (2.8 x  103)  joules of 
irreducible  work,  while  expending  (2.4 x  108)  joules of  jet fuel per  passenger. 34  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
tional constraints  upon economic activity, and the negentropy  balance 
equation  therefore  has a zero shadow price in our generalized  growth 
model. Put differently,  because virtually  all the stock of negentropy  is 
contained  in appropriable  energy resources, the growth  drag  from en- 
tropy is already  contained in the growth drag from energy resources. 
Any further  correction  would be double  counting.46 
In addition,  as Georgescu-Roegen  himself  argued,  the flow of negen- 
tropy  income is enormous  relative  to either  depletable  stocks or current 
use. Georgescu-Roegen  writes, "For, as surprising  as it may seem, the 
entire stock of natural  resources is not worth more than a few days of 
sunlight!"47  It is appropriate  to conclude that, as long as the sun shines 
brightly  on our  fair  planet, the appropriate  estimate  for the drag  from  in- 
creasing  entropy  is zero. 
LAND.  No detailed study has been performed  for agricultural  land, 
but estimates  have been made  by Denison and  these can be extended  to 
future periods.48  Denison's estimate for land follows the simplified 
methodology  outlined  in equation  7. Basically, the growth  drag  is repre- 
sented by the product  of the factor share  of land  times the growth  of the 
economy. For the period 1929 to 1957, Denison estimates that con- 
straints  on land slowed economic growth  by five basis points a year in 
the United States;  estimates  are similar  for Western  Europe  for the post- 
war period.49  I used Denison's methodology  and extended it for the pe- 
riod 1970  to 2050. This provides an estimate of five basis points for the 
period  covered here. 
Environmental Goods 
"Environmental  goods" designate goods for which the social costs 
and benefits are not captured  in market  transaction,  or those with sig- 
nificant  externalities  in consumption  or production.  An example  is clean 
water  in the lower  Rhine  river  as it flows through  the Netherlands.  In the 
46. Concerns  might  arise  about  the cost from  inappropriable  entropy,  as for example, 
the losses to thermal  efficiency  from  a warmer  ocean. 
47. Georgescu-Roegen  (1971,  p. 21). Note that  even though  our potential  negentropic 
income  is vast, we are  utilizing  very  little  of it in practice.  Moreover,  we are  using  virtually 
none of it to build  up stocks of negentropic  wealth  to replace  our  declining  stocks of valu- 
able fossil fuels. 
48. See Denison  (1962,  1967). 
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lower Rhine, boaters, swimmers,  and drinkers  are not charged  for their 
enjoyment  of clean water; nor are Belgians, Germans, or French up- 
stream charged  when they discharge  untreated  wastes into the upper 
Rhine. For environmental  goods, particularly  those that are unregu- 
lated, the commodity  is not bought  or sold in complete markets,  so we 
cannot  generally  assume  that  market  prices  properly  measure  social val- 
uation.  This implies  that  policymakers  face a difficult  task in regulating, 
or perhaps  even creating,  markets;  it also means that the measurement 
of the growth  drag  is much  more  difficult  for the analysis  of environmen- 
tal goods. 
In essence, the issue is whether to take the "cost" approach  or the 
"utility"  approach.  The cost approach  asks how much it would cost to 
prevent  degradation  of environmental  variables.  The utility  approach  is 
concerned with the actual losses or damages suffered  by society. For 
market  goods, these two approaches  coincide at the margin;  for imper- 
fectly regulated  environmental  goods, they do not. In the estimates  that 
follow, I took a mixed  approach. 
GREENHOUSE  WARMING.  A number  of studies investigate the im- 
pact of greenhouse  warming.  The impacts of warming  that have been 
identified  appear  quite small  relative  to overall  national  output  over the 
period under  consideration,  while the costs of control programs  could 
be quite substantial.  However, work in this area is in its infancy. Thus 
the calculations  that  follow are very tentative. 
For purposes of evaluation, assume that a doubling of CO2  or its 
equivalent  will occur by the middle  of the next century.  This estimate  is 
consistent with the high projection of the scientific assessment per- 
formed  by the Intergovernmental  Panel on Climate  Change;50  by com- 
parison,  atmospheric  concentrations  of CO2  have risen  about  26 percent 
since the mid-1800s.51  Current  scientific evidence suggests that a dou- 
bling of CO2  or its equivalent will lead to an equilibrium  increase in 
global mean temperatures  of 1 to 5 degrees Centigrade.52  Putting  these 
estimates  together,  a rough  guess is that, for the United States and  other 
high-income  countries,  the cost of greenhouse  warming  in the middle  of 
the next century  (or of policies to slow greenhouse  warming)  would be 
in the range  of 0 to 2 percent  of world  income (with  the best guess in the 
50. See IPCC  (1990). 
51. IPCC  (1990,  p. xix). 
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middle  of this range).53  On the other  hand,  proposals  to arrest  significant 
future  greenhouse  warming  are estimated  to cost between 1 and 5 per- 
cent of world  income.54  There  is simply  no way of improving  these esti- 
mates today. I will take a value of 2 percent  of total income in 2050  as a 
reasonable  compromise. 
OTHER  ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION.  A final  catchall  category  is 
the cost of preventing  future deterioration  of the environment  (from 
sources other than global environmental  concerns such as those I con- 
sidered in my discussion of greenhouse warming).  Such costs consist 
primarily  of measures to maintain  air and water quality in the face of 
growing  output. 
Estimating  the costs of pollution  control poses many analytical  and 
empirical  hurdles  because of the indirect  nature  of most control  costs. A 
recent  study  has investigated  control  costs systematically  for the United 
States. According  to the U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency (EPA), 
the annual cost of pollution control (current  expenditures  plus annu- 
alized capital  costs) was 2.1 percent  of GNP in 1990  and is estimated  to 
rise to 2.6 to 2.8 percent of GNP in 2000.55  Figure  7 shows these costs 
graphically.  No comparable  estimates of the damages exist, although 
studies for some of the major  categories (such as abatement  of sulfur, 
nuclear wastes,  and toxic wastes) generally find that the damages 
avoided are on the margin  lower than the incremental  costs. EPA has 
also collected data  on comparable  costs for major  OECD  countries.  Ta- 
ble 4 shows estimated  costs. (These are capital  and operating  expendi- 
tures, rather  than the annualized  costs shown in figure  7.) Based on re- 
cent trends,  I use an estimate  of an incremental  rise in pollution  control 
efforts  of 3 percent  of total output  between 1980  and  2050. 
Results 
Table 3 collects the estimates from the different  studies. I must em- 
phasize  that  these figures  are  extremely  tentative.  They rely upon  differ- 
53. See Nordhaus  (1991b)  and  Cline  (1992). 
54. Estimating  the impacts  of and the costs to slow greenhouse  warming  is a major 
growth  industry  today.  The  estimate  of the cost of arresting  future  climate  change  assumes 
that this requires  a cut of 50 to 75 percent  in greenhouse  gas emissions.  These estimates 
are  drawn  from  surveys  of the literature  summarized  in Nordhaus  (1991  a) and  Cline  (1992, 
p. 184). 
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Figure  7. Cost of Pollution  Control  in the United  States, 1972-2000 
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Source: U.S. EPA  (1990,  p. v.). Estimate  for the year  2000  assumes  that  municipal  provisions  of the Clean  Water 
Act and investments  in attaining  the national  ambient  air quality  standard  for ozone will have been implemented. 
ent models and disparate  assumptions.  While on the whole they repre- 
sent the state of today's knowledge  about  the constraints  on growth  for 
high-income  countries, they cannot foresee future  technological  devel- 
opments  or new problems  that  may arise. Most importantly,  they are  in- 
complete; they leave out a number  of significant  ecological problems 
(such as tropical  deforestation,  plagues, or genetic depletion)  that may 
in the future  prove significant. 
Subject  to these reservations,  my estimate  is that  the six factors  iden- 
tified  in table  3 will slow economic  growth  to the middle  of the next cen- 
tury  by about  31  basis  points, or approximately  one-third  of a percentage 
point  a year. (This  estimate  is surprisingly  close to the back-of-the-enve- 
lope estimate  presented  in equation  9 above.) This  growth  rate  compares 
with an estimated  baseline growth  rate, in the models underlying  these 
estimates, of 2.6 percent a year for total output  and 1.6 percent a year 
for per capita output. After taking  account of the resource drag, total 
growth would decline to 2.29 percent a year, while per capita output 38  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Table  4. Estimated  Pollution  Control  Expenditures  in Major  OECD  Countries,  1985 
Percent  of GDP 
Pollution control 
Country  expenditures 
West Germany  1.52 
United States  1.44 
Finland  1.32 
Netherlands  1.26 
United Kingdom  1.25 
France  0.85 
Norway  0.82 
Source: EPA (1990,  pp. 4-8).  Nonhousehold  expenditures  only. 
growth under these estimates would slow this to 1.29 percent (129 basis 
points) a year. 
Roughly speaking, then, I estimate that per capita output growth will 
slow by about one-fifth because of the resource constraints examined in 
table 3. 
Implications  for Today 
One of the oldest  battles in economic  life involves  the struggle be- 
tween advances in technology  and the drag to economic  growth arising 
from population growth and resource exhaustion.  For most of the nine- 
teenth  and twentieth  centuries,  concerns  about  resource  exhaustion 
have receded as technological  change has outpaced the modest degree 
of resource  exhaustion.  New  seeds  and chemical fertilizers have more 
than offset the need to move cultivation to marginal lands; advances  in 
finding and drilling for oil have countered  the need to drill deeper and 
in harsher climates; and modest pollution-abatement  investments  have 
allowed economic  growth to continue while lowering concentrations  of 
many toxic substances.  In short, for the past two centuries,  technology 
has been the clear victor in the race with depletion and diminishing re- 
turns. 
But what about the future? As the globe becomes  more congested,  as 
economic  activity crowds into regions that are less  well endowed  with 
natural resources,  as natural ecosystems  become  more stressed,  will 
history repeat itself?  Or have we  reached  an inflection point that will 
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I have repeatedly emphasized that our estimates are crude, the 
models are primitive,  the future  is uncertain,  and our ignorance  is vast. 
But it is hardly  interesting  to say we don't know, so I will hazard  the 
guess that  resource  constraints  are  likely  to be a small  but  noticeable  im- 
pediment  to economic growth over the next few decades in advanced 
industrial  countries-although an obstacle that will continue to be sur- 
mounted  by technological  advance. On the basis of current  knowledge 
about identified economic, geological, and environmental  factors, I 
estimate that the resource slowdown will be on the order of one-third 
of one percentage  point a year between now and the middle  of the next 
century.  This compares  with an estimated  growth  of output  per  capita  of 
around 1.5 percent a year over the last century in advanced  industrial 
countries. It would take either a massive slowdown in productivity 
growth  or a massive underestimate  of the constraints  to growth  before 
the resource constraints  would actually  produce  a decline in global  liv- 
ing standards. 
Having concluded tentatively that the environmental  and resource 
constraints  on economic growth should be only modest over the next 
half  century,  it is appropriate  to inquire  into the implications  of this  find- 
ing for the conduct of government  policy. The most profound  implica- 
tion  is for our  world  view. Do we take  the "cowboy"  view or the "Dutch" 
view of the world?  In the cowboy view, we can look forward  to limitless 
expansion,  with endless rangeland  to graze, offshore  waters  to drill,  and 
deserts on which to build airports,  shopping  centers, and parking  lots. 
At the other  extreme  is a dour  philosophy  of limits  and  perils,  where  land 
must  be wrested  from  the sea and  we must  be ever vigilant  lest the dikes 
break  and  we become inundated  by the threatening  seas. 
In the last three  decades the environmental  revolution  has fundamen- 
tally changed  our world view so that we can no longer  assume that our 
planet  will remain  unaffected  by human  activities;  the Dutch  are  becom- 
ing gloomier  and  even the cowboys are occasionally  concerned.  At this 
point, we cannot  say whether  the Dutch  or cowboy view is the right  one; 
whether human  interventions  will lead to innocuous, noticeable, seri- 
ous, or catastrophic  consequences. Which  problems  fall into which of 
these four  categories  is one of the major  issues for science policy for the 
foreseeable  future,  and  we cannot  make  intelligent  choices without  bet- 
ter scientific  understanding  about  the interactions  between  human  activ- 
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In addition  to improving  our knowledge, governments  must decide 
where and how to intervene. In some areas, governments  should inter- 
vene, while  in others, governments  should  get out of the way of markets. 
An example  of ineffective  regulation  is in the area  of appropriable  natu- 
ral resources involving oil, natural gas, and farming. For these re- 
sources, governments  the world over have probably  slowed economic 
growth  through  excessive regulation  of price  and  quantity.  In the United 
States, oil and  gas price  controls  have been applied  and  removed  numer- 
ous times since 1954;  these have tended to subsidize consumption  and 
reduce production, with few redeeming social virtues. In centrally 
planned  and developing  countries, subsidies  to energy  production  have 
often been extremely distortionary;  the most egregious  example today 
occurs in Russia, where oil in the summer  of 1992  sold for about 10 to 
20 percent  of the world  market  price.56  Allowing  energy  prices to move 
toward  the undistorted  market  will often be painful  and lead to unwel- 
come shifts in the distribution  of income, but in the long run, govern- 
ment's  bowing  out of the pricing  and  allocation  process for appropriable 
natural  resources  is probably  the most secure  way to ensure  that  our  lim- 
ited supplies  of appropriable  nonrenewable  and  renewable  resources  are 
efficiently  employed. 
Efficiently  managing  environmental  resources poses completely  dif- 
ferent issues because it requires  replacing  the invisible  hand  of markets 
with the visible hand  of government.  There  are no simple  approaches  to 
setting  environmental  policies wisely. Governments  face thorny  choices 
in four distinct areas: selecting the appropriate  areas for intervention, 
finding  the right  level of intervention,  choosing the most efficient  tools 
for minimizing  the net economic harm  from externalities, and coordi- 
nating policies where international  spillovers occur. Because govern- 
ments operate  as monopolists  in the industry  of regulating  environmen- 
tal protection, there is no market test to apply to any of these four 
choices. Governments  can make  many  sound  or foolish decisions about 
regulating  externalities  without  bankrupting  the country  or being  driven 
from  office. In some cases, such as overregulating  the chemical  acrylo- 
nitrile,  the political  and  economic effects of excessively zealous regula- 
tion are trifling;  in others, such as regulating  the health and safety of 
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nuclear  power  plants, an industry  can be posted unceremoniously  to its 
grave. 
Take  greenhouse  warming  as an example  of regulatory  choices. Gov- 
ernments  must decide whether  greenhouse  warming  is sufficiently  seri- 
ous to warrant  the setup costs of establishing  a new regulatory  mecha- 
nism;  the Bush administration  argued  that doing so is premature,  while 
many other governments have made commitments  or even imposed 
"carbon  taxes," which tax emissions of greenhouse gases like CO2. 
Finding the right level of intervention  has proven extremely elusive, 
even among  those who argue  for taking  steps to slow climate  change. A 
good measure  of the stringency  of global-warming  policies is the level of 
carbon  taxes. The European  Community  (EC) has proposed a carbon 
tax of around  $100 per ton carbon (which would more than triple the 
price of coal in the United States); by contrast,  my studies suggest that 
a carbon  tax of $5 to $10 per ton carbon  is the maximum  that would be 
justified  by a cost-benefit  comparison,  and  the $100  carbon  tax would  be 
much  worse than  nothing. 
The third design issue in this area is the selection of policy instru- 
ments. In the United States, command-and-control  approaches  have 
been the major  tools for accomplishing  our regulatory  objectives. As 
noted above, U.S. regulations  have tended  to be between modestly  and 
enormously  cost-ineffective, and only recently and rarely  have market 
instruments  been employed (although  recognition  is increasing  in the 
policy community  of the importance  of cost-effective instruments).  The 
use of taxes on ozone-depleting  chemicals,  the experiment  with  tradable 
SO2  permits, and the EC's contemplation  of carbon taxes are hopeful 
signs of a trend  toward  using more  efficient  regulatory  tools. 
Fourth, combating greenhouse warming will require international 
policy coordination  in much  the same  way as in the areas  of international 
trade policies or exchange-rate  mechanisms. While some deplore the 
snail's pace in reaching  international  agreements  in global warming,  a 
more  cautious  view would  recall  the fate of the first  eleven international 
sanitary  conventions, the League of Nations, the Treaty of Versailles, 
the interwar  disarmament  treaties,  the Bretton  Woods  accord, SALT II, 
or the European  Exchange Rate Mechanism  and suggest that a slow 
movement  toward  consensus may be preferable  to a questionable,  frag- 
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islators  and voters.57  All these difficulties  should not drive us to a con- 
clusion in the style of President  Bush's former  White House Chief of 
Staff John Sununu  that nothing  is better than anything.  However, the 
difficulties  should forewarn  us that many policies are worse than mo- 
mentary  hesitation. 
A final-and the most intractable-issue concerns uncertainty  about 
future  resources, environmental  concerns, and technology. Faced with 
our  profound  ignorance,  should  we respond  like the Bush administration 
on the environment,  waiting  until  uncertainties  are resolved before act- 
ing, or like the Reagan administration  on defense, pursuing  spending 
programs  because of uncertainties  about  the future?  Should  we assume 
the worst  case on climate  change  and  species loss as we did  traditionally 
with  ballistic  missiles  and  the flashpoint  on the West  German  border,  the 
Fulda  Gap? 
The answer  to these questions is no, no, and no. An appropriate  ap- 
proach  to uncertainty  is to weigh the consequences and  likelihoods  of a 
range  of potential  outcomes  and  to take  actions  that  would  maximize  the 
expected  net benefits  of policies. To wait  for uncertainties  to be resolved 
may involve forgoing  inexpensive steps that  will prove highly  beneficial 
if the dice roll unfavorably;  to wait until uncertainties  are resolved is 
likely to mean waiting forever; to defend against the worst case will 
quickly bankrupt  any imaginative  government. In practice, in games 
against  nature,  a best-guess strategy  is likely to come tolerably  close to 
an optimal  policy. The exceptions are when the stakes are very large, 
the outcomes  are  highly  asymmetrical,  the processes are  irreversible,  or 
learning  takes place over time. 
While  the appropriate  treatment  of uncertainty  is not a controversial 
theoretical  issue, it often poses daunting  problems  of estimation  and  im- 
plementation.  The sheer complexity of decisionmaking  under uncer- 
tainty will overwhelm most analysts, for the already-complex  issues 
(surrounding,  say, greenhouse  warming  or species depletion)  are  further 
complicated by the branching  of probability, learning, and decision 
trees. Data problems  are compounded  because those trees depend on 
subjective probabilities,  future values, and evolving technologies that 
cannot be found in any handbook  of economics or physics. For imple- 
57. The perils  of the Treaty  of Versailles  were foreseen  in Keynes (1920),  while  a his- 
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mentation,  these problems  are further  exacerbated  by the four intrinsic 
difficulties  I mentioned  above that  plague  the setting  of efficient  environ- 
mental  policies. 
All these somber thoughts should not lead to despair. Rather, they 
emphasize  the importance  of careful scientific  and policy analysis and 
establishing  or strengthening  institutions  that  contain  incentives  that  are 
compatible  with the thoughtful  balancing  of long-run  costs and benefits 
of social investments.  If it is correct, as this study suggests, that an effi- 
ciently managed  economy need not fear shipwreck  on the reefs of re- 
source exhaustion  or environmental  collapse, this places the responsi- 
bility for wisely steering  our economy in our own hands. The peril lies 
not in the stars  but in ourselves. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert N. Stavins: Because William  Nordhaus'  paper  addresses indi- 
cators of changing  relative scarcity, it may be of interest to note that I 
purchased  my copy of Beyond the Limits about one month  after Nord- 
haus purchased  his, but I was not charged  $20 like he was, but $10. In 
keeping  with  this observation,  my comments  on Nordhaus'  effective cri- 
tique  of Beyond the Limits  are  from  a microeconomic  perspective. 
The Nordhaus paper provides better guidance to the questions of 
concern about scarce resources than either Beyond the Limits or its 
bestselling  predecessor, The  Limits to Growth,  and Nordhaus  does so 
with  less than  5 percent  as many  words. Having  noted this, what  is there 
left for me to add? Because I agree with the criticisms that Nordhaus 
makes of the Limits  I and II models, I asked myself if any exceptions, 
any special cases, existed in which the broad  claim  of the Limits analy- 
sis-"overshoot  and  collapse"-might actually  make sense. 
One  of the central  predictions  of the Limits  studies  is increasing  scar- 
city of natural  resources, both nonrenewable  and renewable. Indeed, 
the Limits books originally  predicted  that numerous  mineral  and fossil 
fuel resources  would  be exhausted,  leading  to precipitous  collapse  of the 
economic system. In venturing  this prediction,  the Limits authors  gave 
little attention,  as Nordhaus  notes, to the crucial  roles played  by explo- 
ration  and discovery, technological  progress, and substitution.  For the 
authors  of the Limits studies, there is no smooth transition,  no gradual 
slowing-down  of activity associated with shifting from one resource 
base to another.  Of course, this flies in the face of the economic theory 
of natural  resources;  more  importantly,  it flies in the face of experience. 
What, then, is the source of the Limits modelers' predictions  of in- 
creasing  scarcity,  of approaching  exhaustion?  First, it is well known  that 
the "static reserve index"-simply  dividing current  reserves of some 
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nonrenewable  natural  resource by current annual use rates-is  quite 
useless as a measure  of scarcity. It ignores the responsiveness of both 
the reserve stock and the use rate to price changes. Hence, the static 
reserve index underestimates  by a dramatic  margin  the "time  until ex- 
haustion."  In fact, these indexes have been relatively constant or in- 
creasing over time. 
If we check today  to see how the Limits  Ipredictions  have turned  out, 
we learn  that (according  to their  estimates)  gold, silver, mercury,  zinc, 
and lead should  be thoroughly  exhausted, with natural  gas running  out 
within  the next eight years. Of course, this has not happened.  Reserves 
have increased,  demand  has changed,  substitution  has occurred,  and  re- 
cycling has been stimulated. 
There is abundant  evidence, as the Nordhaus  paper  illustrates,  that 
the "economic scarcity"  of natural  resources has been-to  a large de- 
gree-declining,  not increasing.  Evidence goes back to the pioneering 
1963  study  by Harold  Barnett  and  Chandler  Morse, which  found  declin- 
ing real unit costs of extraction  over time for nonrenewable  resources.  ' 
On  the other  hand,  more  recent evidence indicates  that  the time trend  is 
not monotonic,  particularly  in terms  of relative  prices. Indeed, some of 
the more  recent  analyses  have detected  evidence of increasing  scarcity.2 
It is interesting  to recall,  in this  regard,  Robert  Pindyck's  work,  which 
demonstrated  in theoretical  terms  why resource  prices  were likely to de- 
cline during  an initial  period  but increase  later, as the marginal  product 
of exploration  begins  to decline  and  as technologies  of recovery  begin  to 
exhibit  diminishing  returns.3  Margaret  Slade later  examined  the tempo- 
ral price paths of numerous  resource categories and verified  for many 
resources the  U-shaped pattern predicted implicitly by  Pindyck's 
analysis.4 
Research  with other scarcity  indicators-including marginal  discov- 
ery cost' and marginal  extraction  cost6-has  confirmed  these patterns. 
Of course, as Richard  Norgaard  has argued, economic scarcity mea- 
sures are accurate indicators  of scarcity only if the information  upon 
1. Barnett  and  Morse  (1963). 
2. See, in particular,  Smith  (1980). 
3. Pindyck  (1978). 
4.  Slade  (1982). 
5. Devarajan  and  Fisher  (1982). 
6. Barnett  and  Morse  (1963);  Johnson,  Bell, and  Bennett  (1980). 46  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
which the market  is exercising its judgment  is itself reasonably  accu- 
rate.7  In any event, what  is most striking  about  all of this research  is that 
it is the renewables,  not the nonrenewables,  that  seem most prominently 
to exhibit increasing  scarcity (including  forestry, agriculture,  and fish- 
eries). 
This brings  me to a case in which the Limits  prophecy  of "overshoot 
and collapse" can  make sense. It is with a subset of renewable re- 
sources:  biological  ones, such as species. The natural  growth  functions 
of a substantial  number  of species exhibit  what  has come to be known  as 
"critical  depensation."8  This refers to a growth  path (plotting  the time 
rate of change of the stock, or population,  against the stock level) in 
which below some critical  level of the stock of the species, the natural 
rate  of growth  is negative.  The result  is a set of three  equilibria.  Two are 
stable: extinction (the origin) and the "carrying  capacity"-the  maxi- 
mum  stock that  habitat  can support.  The third  equilibrium  is the critical 
one: the minimum  viable population.  It reflects  the reality  that  the large 
ranges  of habitat  that  exist for some species, such as whales, mean  that 
relatively small numbers  are insufficient  for mating  pairs to yield birth 
rates  that  exceed the rate  of loss to predators  and  disease. This is an un- 
stable  equilibrium. 
In the nineteenth  century,  hunters  did  not shoot down  each and  every 
passenger pigeon, but nevertheless, the species was driven to extinc- 
tion. A similar  pattern  has doomed  other species. A contemporary  case 
in point  is the blue  whale. Harvesting  has been prohibited  under  interna- 
tional  agreements  since 1965,  but stocks continue  to decline toward  ex- 
tinction.  Thus the case in which some kind  of "overshoot  and  collapse" 
might actually occur is the case of renewable-in  particular,  biologi- 
cal-resources.9 
The irony  is that  the so-called  "exhaustible"  resources  are nothing  of 
the kind. They are really quite inexhaustible,  for the host of reasons 
economists have noted for at least a half century. That  is why such re- 
sources are better labeled "nonrenewable  resources." It is the renew- 
able resources that in some cases are very much exhaustible-not  be- 
cause of their  finiteness,  but because of the way they are managed.  The 
7. Norgaard  (1990). 
8. Clark(1990). 
9. A broader  class of biological  growth  functions, exhibiting  generalized  "depensa- 
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problem  typically  is not physical limits on resource availability;  on the 
contrary, improper  incentives and inadequate information  are more 
often the source  of the declining  stocks.  10  Thus  the reason  why some re- 
sources-water,  forests, fisheries, and some species of wildlife-are 
threatened,  while others-principally minerals  and  fossil fuels-are  not 
is that  the scarcity  of nonrenewable  resources  is well reflected  in market 
prices. This is much less the case for renewable resources, which, in 
fact, are characterized  by being open access or common property  re- 
sources. 
This conclusion prompts  at least two responses. First, it can be said 
that this conclusion is not really what the Limits authors  had in mind 
when they predicted  "overshoot and collapse." This is certainly true. 
Second, it could  be said  that  the necessity to identify  such a special  case 
in order to validate-in  a sense-the  Limits conclusions is itself evi- 
dence of the overall legitimacy of the Nordhaus critique. This is also 
correct. 
Having  said that, I wish to turn  to an area that is best categorized  as 
not even an exception to the Nordhaus  critique,  but as an extension of 
it. Something  that  differentiates  both  the time  of publication  and  the con- 
tents of Limits  II from  Limits  I is an expanded  concern beyond nonre- 
newable and renewable  resources to environmental  resources, such as 
clean air and water. Here the empirical  evidence is growing  that-con- 
trary  to the assumptions  of the Limits  modelers-economic growth  does 
not necessarily  produce  greater  pollution. 
For some environmental  problems,  such as inadequate  sanitation  and 
unsafe  drinking  water, there  is a monotonic  and inverse  relationship  be- 
tween the level of the environmental  threat  and  per  capita  income.  "  I  This 
relationship  holds both cross-sectionally  (across nations)  and  for single 
nations  over time. For other environmental  problems,  the relationship 
with income level is not monotonic  at all, but a "hill."  At low levels of 
income, pollution  increases  with  per  capita  income. Then  at some point, 
pollution  begins to decline with  further  increases  in income. This is true 
of most forms of air'2  and water  pollution, some types of deforestation, 
and  habitat  loss. 
Pollution  increases  from  the least developed agricultural  countries  to 
10. Tietenberg  (1992). 
11. World  Bank  (1992). 
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those beginning  to industrialize  fully, such as Mexico and the emerging 
market  economies of Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet 
Union. After peaking  in such nations, pollution  declines in the wealth- 
ier, industrialized  nations  that have both the demand  for cleaner  air  and 
water and the means to provide it. Finally, for another  set of environ- 
mental  pollutants,  including  carbon  dioxide emissions, the relationship 
between per capita income and emission levels increases monotoni- 
cally, at least within  the realm  of experience. 
In conclusion, I would  like to acknowledge  that  the first  Limits  study 
did have one positive social impact. It provided  the stimulus  for some 
leading economists to carry out work in the area of natural  resource 
depletion. I will close my commentary  on Nordhaus's  excellent paper 
by noting  that  the second study is following  in that  tradition. 
The Limits  analysis  is particularly  disappointing  because the general 
area  of inquiry-global resource  and  environmental  issues-would  ben- 
efit from more analysis. It is obviously not enough to say that markets 
will automatically  respond appropriately  to scarcity. Imperfections  in 
markets  and imperfections  in public policies clearly reduce the effec- 
tiveness of these responses. Common  property  resources,  externalities, 
the tax treatment  of resources,  and  price  controls  are  more  thanjust  rare 
exceptions. Unfortunately,  none of the required  analysis  is provided  by 
the Limits  modelers. 
Furthermore,  the current debate surrounding  the notion of "sus- 
tainability"  is not advanced  by the analyses of Limits  I or II. This is un- 
fortunate  because that  debate has recently  moved beyond an economic 
critique  of what is, at best, a poorly defined  concept, to some attention 
to a set of underlying and better-defined issues.'3  The result may eventu- 
ally be some common ground  for discussion between economists and 
ecologists-who  typically hold such different  perspectives-on  key is- 
sues such as the composition  of social capital,  intergenerational  equity, 
and the scale of human  activity.  14 
Finally,  it is worthwhile  to reflect  briefly  on the U.S. experience  with 
pollution  control  policies because  doing  so offers  the reminder  that  more 
than  once-in  the environmental  area, as perhaps  in others-society,  in 
choosing  public  policies, has tended  to "do  the right  thing,"  although  for 
13. Solow(1991). 
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the "wrong  reasons." A recent example of this is the planned  cutback 
under  the Clean  Air  Act amendments  of 1990  of emissions  of sulfur  diox- 
ide as a means  of limiting  acid rain. The original  motivation  was to pro- 
tect Adirondack  lakes and  Eastern  forests, but  the evidence has pointed 
toward very small benefits, relative to the costs of control. More re- 
cently, however, evidence has emerged  indicating  that  the human  health 
impacts  of sulfate  particles  can be significant,  and may indeed provide 
some economic rationale,  after  all.  '5 
This  leads me to ask what  the actual  policy prescriptions  of the Limits 
analysis  are. It is not perfectly  clear. The book lays out a set of "steps  to 
avoid collapse,"  but some of these are impossible  to translate  into terms 
of public  policy. Of those that can be translated  into public  policy, the 
first  is one that  is hard  to disagree  with, in general,  anyway:  "improving 
the signals." The Limits authors call for internalizing  environmental 
costs in prices, presumably  through  taxes or tradable  permit  systems. 
In addition,  and somewhat  more  controversially,  they call for recasting 
economic indicators  such as GNP to account for uninternalized  exter- 
nalities  and  the depreciation  of natural  capital. 
Second, the Limits  authors  recommend  minimizing  the use of nonre- 
newable resources. This recommendation  does not, as a general rule, 
make sense. The authors  urge society to "recycle  whenever  possible," 
which also, of course, would be flawed  public policy. Recycling has a 
role to play, but a limited  one in extending  the resource  base. In terms 
of waste management  strategies,  safe landfilling  and  incineration  should 
certainly  be part  of the overall  portfolio. 
Third,  the Limits  authors  call for the prevention  of "the  erosion  of re- 
newable resources,"  urging  society to maintain  stocks at their current 
levels. Again, as a general rule, this makes no sense economically, 
whether  for soils, water  supplies, or biological  species. 
In a sense, I may have given the Limits  modelers  too much  credit  for 
these policy prescriptions  because they also maintain  that such "piece- 
meal  approaches,"  as they call them, are  doomed  to failure  and  that  only 
the cessation of economic growth  can avoid "overshoot  and collapse." 
Thus as Nordhaus  notes, the modelers  do indeed call for a cessation of 
economic growth. In so doing, they demonstrate  a common misunder- 
standing  among noneconomists  about the nature  of economic growth. 
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They seem to think  of it in terms  of more  and more  cars or refrigerators 
for those who already  have them, not more efficient  refrigerators,  more 
CD's instead  of record  players, or more and better vaccines to prevent 
disease. 
In conclusion, I would  like to acknowledge  that  the first  Limits study 
did have one positive social impact. It provided  the stimulus  for some 
leading economists to carry out work in the area of natural  resource 
depletion. I will close my commentary  on Nordhaus's excellent paper 
by noting  that  the second study is following  in that  tradition. 
Martin L. Weitzman: This is an outstanding  paper.  William  Nordhaus 
is the senior scholar in this area who is almost uniquely  positioned to 
collect, dissect, and  reassemble  in perspective  all the relevant  limits-to- 
growth  arguments.  The result is an impressive, balanced  account that 
leaves few stones unturned.  I think  this paper  represents  the economic 
state  of the art,  circa 1992,  in dealing  seriously  and  honestly  with  the ma- 
jor limits-to-growth  arguments.  The conclusions seem to me to be basi- 
cally  reasonable  and  well argued.  As a discussant,  I am  left with  the mea- 
ger task of rearranging  a few stories here or there and looking at the 
landscape  from  some slightly  different  angles. 
I would like to address  a general  point about evaluating  the drag  on 
growth  surrounding  environmental  improvement  that  is not fully under- 
stood or articulated  in the literature.  This point goes beyond the cost 
versus utility  distinction  that  is frequently  made. 
How much  is it really  "costing  us"  to prevent  local environmental  de- 
terioration  such as air and water  pollution?  One way to get a handle  on 
this concept is to look at a figure  such as total annualized  costs for all 
pollution  control  activities  in the United  States. The Environmental  Pro- 
tection Agency (EPA) has recently performed  a systematic study that 
shows pollution  control costs as a fraction  of GNP rising  from 0.9 per- 
cent in 1972  to 1.9 percent in 1987  and projected  to increase to around 
2.7 percent  in the year  2000.1  It is tempting  to think  of this percentage  as 
representing  the cost of a clean environment.  Actually, there are rea- 
sons to believe that such numbers  represent  a systematic  underestimate 
of "environmental  drag." 
Consider  the following amended  version of the standard  one-sector 
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neoclassical  growth  model. A homogeneous  output  is produced  by capi- 
tal and labor  with the possible help of technological  progress. Suppose 
that the output  itself is objectionable,  if it is not corrected, because of 
environmental  disamenities  such as pollution, crowding,  and degrada- 
tion of natural  sites. For a variety  of reasons, this kind  of environmental 
sensitivity increases with rising income. The degree of environmental 
disamenity  can be lessened by expending  resources  to improve  the envi- 
ronment.  The homogeneous output is divided into three components. 
The first  two components  are traditional  consumption  and investment. 
The third  component  might  be thought  of as cleanup  costs of pollution, 
but  a far  more  general  interpretation  is possible:  the total  cost of all envi- 
ronmental  policies. 
The level of environmental  amenity  is now some function  negatively 
related  to economic  activity  (represented  by total  output)  and  positively 
related to the amount  of national  income spent on environmental  im- 
provements.  That  is, society can trade  off some of the "bad"  from eco- 
nomic activity by  spending more on the "good" of  environmental 
cleanup. 
Now any socially efficient  approach  to lessening the degree of envi- 
ronmental  disamenity  as an economy develops will consist of a two- 
pronged  attack.  The direct  prong  is to spend  more  on environmental  im- 
provement. The indirect  prong is to have less output by growing  less 
fast. For instance,  an efficient  strategy  for decreasing  automobile  pollu- 
tion will contain some combination  of controlling  emissions on each 
auto combined with a mechanism  for restraining  the total number  of 
autos. 
The degree  to which society goes with one approach  or the other  will 
depend, among  other things, on some technologically  given parameter 
essentially  measuring  the elasticity  of environmental  improvement  with 
respect to spending. If this elasticity is high and the environment  im- 
proves readily  with environmental  spending,  then the adverse environ- 
mental  consequences that accompany  increased  economic activity will 
be offset by greater  environmental  spending. In this case, the income 
spent on environmental  improvement-the "cost of clean"-is  a rela- 
tively good proxy for the appropriate  social cost of preventing  environ- 
mental  deterioration. 
However, when  the elasticity  of environmental  improvement  with  re- 
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the impact  of environmental  disamenities  is to rely more  on lowering  na- 
tional  product  by slowing  economic growth  than  on increasing  environ- 
mental  spending.  This is because it is expensive to undo environmental 
degradation  by increased  spending.  In this case-when  the elasticity of 
environmental  improvement  with respect to environmental  spending  is 
low-the  level of environmental  spending  underestimates  the degree of 
environmental  drag, as measured  by the "equivalent  evaporation"  or 
"equivalent  leakage"  of national  product  because of the externality.  I do 
not know the correct  parameter  values, but a theoretical  result  suggests 
that with elasticities of one or one-half, the appropriate  drag  is two or 
three  times the spending  on environmental  cleanup. 
A correction  such as this alone would  not be nearly  enough  to reverse 
the essence of Nordhaus'  final  accounting,  but  I suspect  that  the fraction 
of GNP spent on improving  the environment  is likely to continue to 
grow. Many  hidden  costs, such as protecting  wetlands, do not show up 
in any EPA numbers.  I suspect too that  the magnitude  of such invisible 
costs is likely to increase in the future. When  all these effects are com- 
bined, the distant  future  impact  of local environmental  goods might  be 
considerably  more than has been calculated.  My main  point is not that 
the story  Nordhaus  is telling  comes unstuck  empirically,  but  that  in prin- 
ciple a serious issue of undervaluing  environmental  drag may occur 
when only spending  on environmental  improvement  is used as a proxy. 
I would like now to expand  upon a point that has already  been made 
well in this paper.  As Nordhaus  fairly  and accurately  shows, the debate 
about future limits to growth is ultimately  an empirical  one. The out- 
come depends  upon deep structural  parameters  and assumptions  about 
human  behavior. The cast of prominent  characters  is by now familiar: 
elasticities of  substitution, factor augmenting  technological change, 
population  growth, stocks of natural  resources, the income elasticity of 
environmental  tastes, and so forth. 
But all this begs a further  question. If the debate about  the feasibility 
and  desirability  of future  economic  growth  will not be resolved by theo- 
retical  reasoning,  but must  ultimately  be resolved  by the answers  to em- 
pirical  questions, then why does such an enormous  difference  of opin- 
ions occur?  In a way, the very excellence of this paper  begs the question 
more strongly.  To economists, or at least to me, the conclusions  of this 
paper  seem reasonable,  even convincing.  Yet the other  side in the limits- 
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environmental  catastrophe.  If Nordhaus  is right  that the question ulti- 
mately  comes down to a difference  in empirical  world  views, then what 
are the empirical  differences, where do they come from, and why are 
they so large?  I think  it is important  to try to address  such issues, how- 
ever tentatively. There may be a some value in trying  to understand  a 
little  better  why the advocates  of the limits-to-growth  view see things  so 
differently  and  what, if anything,  might  narrow  the differences. 
I think  that there are two major  differences  in empirical  world views 
between mainstream  economists and  anti-growth  conservationists.  The 
average  ecologist sees everywhere that carrying  capacity is a genuine 
limit  to growth.  Every empirical  study, formal  or informal,  confirms  this 
truth. And every meaningful  theoretical  model has this structure  built 
in. Whether  it is algae, anchovies, or arctic  foxes, a limit to growth  al- 
ways appears. To be sure, carrying  capacity is a long-term  concept. 
There  may  be temporary  population  upswings  or even population  explo- 
sions, but they always swing down or crash  in the end because of finite 
limits represented  by carrying  capacity. And Homo sapiens is just an- 
other  species-one  that  actually  is genetically  much  closer to its closest 
sister  species, chimpanzees,  than  most animals  are to their  closest sister 
species. 
Needless to say, the average  contemporary  economist  does not read- 
ily see any long-term  carrying  capacity constraints  for human  beings. 
The  historical  record  is full  of past  hurdles  to growth  that  were overcome 
by substitution  and  technological  progress.  The numbers  on contempo- 
rary  growth,  and  the evidence  before  one's eyes, do not seem to be send- 
ing signals  that we are running  out of substitution  possibilities  or out of 
inventions  that  enhance  productivity. 
This is the first major  difference between the empirical  big picture 
seen by mainstream  economists and limits-to-growth  conservationists. 
The second major  difference  is a little more subtle, to my mind. It con- 
cerns the possibility that humans can say at some point "enough is 
enough";  we have more  than  sufficient  goods to go around  and  must  be- 
gin seriously  to limit  output  and  consumption. 
Economists  are skeptical  of the possibilities  for such self-limiting  be- 
havior. Advocates of limits tend to be more optimistic  that, in a state 
of general  abundance,  human  attitudes  toward  further  accumulation  can 
change  or be changed. 
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these two issues obviously  exists. Could  limits-to-growth  conservation- 
ists ever come closer to seeing things the economist's way? Well, per- 
haps  they have, a little bit, over time. Perhaps  papers  like this one have 
made  some difference. 
What  about  the other direction?  Could  economists ever believe any- 
thing  like the above two limits-to-growth  arguments?  Actually, econo- 
mists  did, once-not  a decade  or generation  ago, but  a century  or so ago. 
Much  of classical  economics, with  its long-run  "stationary  state,"  had 
a fairly  well developed  limits-to-growth  argument.  To be sure, it lacked 
the drama  and violent overshooting  of the latest catastrophic  versions, 
but  the argument  that  growth  would  have to stop because of limiting  fac- 
tors-most  notably  land-was  definitely  there. 
Furthermore,  the writings  of our esteemed colleagues of the past are 
full of references  to the idea that  society will achieve general  satiation  in 
the distant  future, when even the poorest will live as the richest once 
had. With  more  than  enough  to go around,  people will work  less and  en- 
joy leisure more. This vision is expressed in the writings  of Marx, of 
Mill, of Keynes, and of many  others. 
It can be argued  that these economists underestimated  the potential 
of technical change, or that they did not really understand  human  na- 
ture. Maybe  that  is true. But I must say it gives me some pause in trying 
to think  about the distant  future. Maybe it is we who are now overesti- 
mating  the potential  of technical  change  or it is we who do not really  un- 
derstand  human  nature. If we mainstream  economic thinkers  reversed 
ourselves so strongly  over the last century, why shouldn't  we reverse 
ourselves again  over the next century? 
Nordhaus  bravely  takes a stand  on what will happen  to growth  in the 
middle  of the next century, after  properly  cautioning  us about how un- 
certain  we must  be. A modest slowdown is what he predicts. I suppose 
my point estimate  would be close to his, but I think  my standard  devia- 
tion might  be larger. 
General Discussion 
The contrast  between the world  views of mainstream  economists, as 
represented  in this paper, and adherents  of the limits-to-growth  school 
captured  the attention  of several  participants.  Richard  Cooper  observed 
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growth. Classical  economists such as David Ricardo  made the mistake 
of applying  the concept of diminishing  marginal  returns  to the long run, 
as well as to the short run. Cooper  expressed optimism  that functional 
substitutes  would  be found  for any good that  becomes too scarce  and  too 
costly. Although  not quite  as optimistic,  William  Nordhaus  agreed  with 
Cooper and cautioned against costly overreactions  by policymakers. 
The dangers  of overreaction  prompted  Nordhaus  to draw  a parallel  to 
Arthur  Okun's statement  about inflation:  the problem  with inflation  is 
not the cost of inflation,  but the cost of reacting  to stop it. 
William  Brainard  suggested  two further  distinctions  between the two 
world views. First, environmentalists,  more so than economists, tend 
to be concerned  about  irreversibility-the fear that  the world  is moving 
down a path from which there is no return.  Second, environmentalists 
envision a future  world in which each country has living standards  on 
a par with the United States or Switzerland  today. Environmentalists' 
concerns  and  strong  policy prescriptions  stem  from  envisioning  the con- 
sequences of such a high  standard  with current  patterns  of pollution  and 
resource  depletion.  Hence the underlying  vision that  motivates  environ- 
mentalists  differs  greatly  from  the world  as it is today, or the world  that 
economists, implicitly, believe would evolve.  Nordhaus added that 
there  was a common  misunderstanding  about  what  economic  growth  en- 
tails. It is not a linear  process in which  one steel mill  or one landfill  leads 
inexorably  to ten as the economy grows. He emphasized  that  we should 
be concerned about depletion of biological resources in particular, 
rather  than renewable resources in general. The sustainability  of re- 
sources that are both scarce and essential in some way should  be a par- 
ticular  concern. 
Martin  Weitzman  noted the controversial  argument  by the limits-to- 
growth  school that "enough  is enough":  that we have reached  satiation 
in consumption  of goods and services. Robert  Gordon  questioned  that 
claim in view of large inequalities  in the distribution  of goods and ser- 
vices around  the world. Enough is enough for whom? Gordon  asked. 
Certainly  not for starving  children  in Somalia, or for Americans  in the 
bottom 20 percent of the income distribution,  or for 80 percent of the 
world's  people, he argued. 
Nordhaus  suggested  several  other  reasons  for the difference  in world 
views. First, the time horizons of the two schools differ: mainstream 
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environmentalists  do. Second, environmentalists  weigh environmental 
factors heavily in their  utility  function,  putting  a heavy emphasis  on en- 
vironmental  consumption.  He acknowledged  that those with a biocen- 
tric view would reject economists' utilitarian  analysis. Some environ- 
mentalists  would wish to include the "utility"  of other forms of life, as 
well as human  utility, in the societal welfare function. Third,  environ- 
mentalists  may attach  substantial  weight  to the risk of damage  from  un- 
foreseen factors that cannot be fully accounted for in any projection. 
Nordhaus  compared  the mindset  of an  environmentalist  who favors  zero 
economic growth to that of the captain  of the QE II: "You can't hit a 
shoal if you don't leave the port." Fear of the unknown, coupled with 
concern  about  irreversibilities,  leads some environmentalists  to adopt  a 
disinclination  for any growth  or change, Nordhaus  argued.  Cooper  ad- 
dressed  the difficulties  of dealing  with uncertainty.  Because no markets 
exist to insure  against  the high-level  risks of failure  of the earth  as a sys- 
tem, a common view on collective risk aversion is needed and can be 
established only through the political process, where debate will be 
fierce  and  where the prevailing  view may change  over time. 
Robert  Gordon  noted  that  the EPA estimates  of the costs of pollution 
control  amount  to a reduction  of less than  one-tenth  of 1  percent  in GDP 
growth  rates. He  judged this figure  to be too low in view of the extent of 
environmental  regulation.  Nordhaus  stressed  the limitations  of the EPA 
calculations.  They represent  only the costs shown on firms'  books as in- 
curred  in controlling  pollution. This calculation  is likely to understate 
the real total cost by omitting  other  parts  of it, including  the chilling  ef- 
fect that  environmental  controls  may  have in restraining  certain  types of 
research and development, and the costs of shifting  from dirty proc- 
esses, whose costs of controlling  pollution  are high, to clean processes, 
whose control  costs are lower. On the other hand,  the EPA figures  may 
be overstated to the extent that innovation  that reduces other costs is 
induced by the introduction  of environmental  controls; these induced 
cost reductions  will not be counted, but  the accounting  costs of the con- 
trols will be. 
Remarking  on the fact that stumpage  prices fail to follow the same 
pattern  as other  resources,  Robert  Hall suggested  that  the pattern  arises 
because forests in the United States, at least in the Northwest, are 
largely government-owned.  He suggested that large efficiency losses 
have arisen  from  underexploitation  of federal  forests. William D.  Nordhaus  57 
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